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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
The most widely discussed explanations of etluiic

w rong.

Ethnic conflict

conflict are, at best...

not caused directly by inter-group differences,
ancient hatreds” and centuries-old feuds... Nor were etlmic passions, long
is

bottled up by repressive

communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end

of the Cold War. (Lake and Rothcliild, 1996)

Reflecting on international affairs

waves of oppression which
political identity.

in the 20"' centur>'

demands

resulted in the persecution of

Whether we

recall the

Palestinians and the state of Israel or

Holocaust, the

more

recently the

war, the extent to which identity has been used as a

many people on

as the practice of

is

nothing

it (ir).

new

Indeed,

it

to the discipline

has revealed

however, as nation-states change, borders
awareness of the importance of studying

A
order,

shift

would have occurred

in the

could overwhelm anv

it

throughout the 20'^ centurv'.

and migrants

political identity

is

Now,

travel with greater rapidity our

burgeoning.

War world

holds that the communist

any identity-based conflicts which naturally

absence of a central organizing power (Green, 1994: 145-146).

Hence, recent identity/nationalist-based conflicts since 1989/1991
Balkans and Baltics

could be argued that the

of International Relations (IR) as the well

itself

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, stifled

between

mass displacements of the Bosnian

political tool

traditional interpretation of the post-Cold

namely

the basis of their

territorial disputes

scholar or practitioner of international relations. For this reason

concept of identity

attention to the dangerous

reflect inevitable consequences.

interpretation by arguing that there

is

areas such as the

This project seeks to challenge such an

nothing “natural” about these conflicts. Rather, the

of the communist order has allowed regional political/economic
intemational/regional attention, and

in

in

fall

elites to strive for

so doing they have mobilized their populations on the

basis of ehosen factors such as identity (including, for example, qualities such as race,

ethnicity, religion, language, customs, etc.).

1

have these

\Vli\

elites

been seeking so much attention? One possibility

is

that

without the minimal material protection granted by the communist order
(Green, 1994: 146),
individual nation-states

now

are in need of important resources

— be

the\’

ph\sical or

intellectual (e.g. leadership, civil society promotion, etc.). This has
resulted in interstate

competition, which
that

I

in several instances

has been based upon the choice of identity, a choice

hold to be more arbitrary' than natural. Nevertheless,

significance of questioning

so popular

In

in certain

why

the decision to rely

regions of the post-Cold

War

work

is

Nevertheless,

been

world.

in

order to frame the need for such an approach

this

does not demand another

to the

and nationalism. Prevalent

tiring analysis

is

these texts without regurgitating

all

it

is

necessary to revisit some

dominant aspects of the discourse of
of classical IR

absent

and nationalism. This of course requires some

in

texts.

Rather,

them with respect

critical attention to the

I

IR.

shall

to identity

substance of

of their propositions or reviving familiar debates.

Realism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism

dominant

paper the

identity for mobilization has

to identity politics

give attention to their failures by virtue of what

politics

in this

a constructivist approach to understanding identity-based conflicts.

of the texts which are considered fundamental

However,

acknowledge

keeping with the central argument of this writing, case studies have been taken

from the Balkans and the Baltics with respect
in this

upon

I

still

tend to remain part of the

theoretical approaches to understanding and even practicing international relations.

Certainly, critical theorists of IR have responded by providing a wealth of studies

challenging the dominant discourse with respect to identity politics and nationalism. For

reason

it

will

be important to pause and chronicle

how

a reaction to the dominant discourse

has evolved. This requires giving attention to texts such as Morgenthau’s Politics
Nations, Waltz’ Theory of International Politics and institutionalist

As

I

argue with respect to

my

Among

literature.

case studies, national and regional leaders in the

Balkans and Baltics, especially since the end of the Cold War, have been mobilizing their

2

this

populations on the basis of identity. This has led

which themselves have

flieled physical conflicts

include the former Yugoslavia

in the

situation has differed in substance

in

many

instances to nationalist assertions

(Famen. 1994: 49-50). Prominent examples

Balkans and Latvia

and has not erupted

that has occurred in the Balkans. Tliis
does not imply,

in the Baltics,

into the exact

however,

though the Latvian

same t>pe of violence

that the Latvian case

is

less

serious or less volatile.

Although regional/national
and other phenomena

elites often

have relied upon historical conflicts, m\ths

order to drive present-day disputes,

in

conflicts represent a hybridization of the old

I

argue that

and the new, suggesting

many of the

current

that identity-based

disputes do not represent renewals of ancient, timeless hatreds.
Rather, they manifest

themselves as the efforts of leaders/elites seeking to preser\'e their status
and the security of
those

whom

would

they allegedly represent. If historical progression were perfectly linear
there

exist a direct descent

However,

historv'

of customs/teachings preserv'ing those ^^ancient” hatreds.

and subsequent generations do not perfectly maintain the

noticeable degree the past has been re-presented to the masses in such a

past.

way

To

a

that events

been retained selectively, without complete accurac>’ and certainly without a confidant
of objectivity. (Objectivih’ tends

to be lost at

intention to introduce a paradigm

w hich

Such

conflict has not

always occurred

research will help to explain

how

it

‘‘identity

who

in

is

not

my

world. Part of this

some.

groups”
use a

w ill encompass

w ide

individuals at the

variety of characteristics in order

from other groups. Examples of such characteristics include but

to race, ethnicity, religion, language, customs, etc.

these variables are prone to change (Walker in Drobizheva, 1996:

sometimes

War

regions of the post-Cold

has occurred

sub-national, national or transnational level

by no means are limited

it

level

universalizes the study of identity-based conflict.

in all

For the purpose of this writing,

to distinguish themselves

an early stage.) Nevertheless,

have

3),

certain characteristics assert themselves over the others.
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Furthermore,

meaning

In fact,

it

that

could be

argued that identity could be based on some veiy obscure characteristics

demanded adherence

political situation or event

to them.

if

a particular

For instance, traditional

determinants of identity such as ethnicity could be overridden by factors such as class or
educational level.

Tliis,

however,

is

just

one

possibility.

Since an array of scholars and policymakers

still

adlieres to the theories propagated

these and related texts, and since this endeavor deals with the post-communist world,

still

relevant to pose a challenge in response to the traditional texts. However,

important to note that thinking

example, from Morgenthau

in

IR has not followed a perfect

to the critical theorists.

taken from various historical periods

made

a tremendous effort

in

is

pertinent to

can

it

how do we know

But
response

is

IR are defective and even dangerous

in

— that

“just observ'e”-

of which outwardly

call for

militarism/force/sanctions

never really took place).
scholar to ask

of

my

topic.

why

But

is,

my

argument. Critical theorists have

fuel.

to the artificial nature

Yet

is still

it

is

of identity

important to contrast

how

the dominant

for practitioners of international politics.

still

dominant? One

many

diplomacy and peace but ultimately choose
allege that negotiation has failed (even if “negotiation”

quick glance

at the classical te.xts

I

have chosen prompts any

they have been selected given their marginal

this

number of materials

just observ e the current foreign policies of states,

when they

A

also

the contrary, a

approaches are

that the traditional

is

linear progression, for

these efforts with the traditional approaches in order to demonstrate

approaches

it

To

debunking nnths with respect

constmetion as well as the nationalism(s) that

it is

by

exactly

why

if

not nonexistent treatment

such texts must be analyzed. They remain as

fundamental works within the discipline of IR yet despite the expectation that identity would
be deemed a part of the discourse,

it

is

absent

in

them. Therefore,

I

provide a review of three

other texts which should serv'e as a transition toward the approach this writing takes in
relation to identity-based conflict in the

post-communist world. These texts also serve as a

prelude and a foundation for the argument that

4

is

being advanced.

Although a

better understanding of constructi\

writing progresses, at the least

how

I

ist

approaches will be made as

this

take constructivism to include a process of understanding

concepts, meanings and (socio-political)

phenomena

are created through an

intersubjective process (Wendt, 1992: 396), usually between a

minimum of two

actors at the

individual or group level. Constructivism also asserts the role of structures at the
international level as they relate to the creation of state interests (1994; 385).

no means should

404).

how

Hence

approach

to

be assumed that

interests or identities are pre-given or prior to social

Rendering an almost “Lacanian”' description of identity formation, Wendt

interaction.

discusses

it

However, by

actors construct their identities in relation to the existence of others (1992:

this project

emplo\ s,

in part,

a sociological (and to an extent a psychological)

understanding international relations.

It

focuses upon intertwining theory with

practice and demonstrating the close relationship between both, in spite of existing

perceptions which are reluctant to address the role of theory.

and how the self comes
Lacanian psychological theory, for e.xaniple, addresses the role of self and other,
Formative of the
as
Stage
Mirror
“The
Lacan,
to be defined by its relation to the other. See Jacques
Ronald Schleifer,
and
Davis
Con
Robert
in
Experience”
Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanahlic
1994.
Group,
pp. 381-386.
Publishing
Longman
NY;
Conteniporarv Literary Criticism. White Plains,
'
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CHAPTER

2

REVIEW OF CLASSICAL AND TRANSITIONAL TEXTS
Because a
basis of ideas

plurality of policymakers continues to practice international relations

stemming from

the traditional theoretical approaches to IR,

give attention to the texts representing them.
created a dominant tradition reflected
especially since the end of the Second

have contributed

to a self-fulfilling

I

necessary to

and theory of international

World War. Such
in

is

use the term “traditional” because they have

in the practice

prophecy

it

on the

relations,

texts reveal that their principles

which practitioners of

believe that they provide the soundest approaches. However,

when

international politics

their policy choices

generate adverse consequences, policymakers, instead of challenging these approaches
actually adhere to and perpetuate them despite the flaws of their logic.

Consider, for example. Politics

of IR but reveals

text.

This

(e.g. in

is

its

Among Nations.

deficiencies regarding identity polities largely

achieved through

its

insistence

a world of bipolarity, multipolarity,

identity because the concept, if

reduced to

This work

state identity

it

upon the
etc.).

state as a

The end

is

treated as a “core” text

by what

is

absent in the

fundamental, primaix' actor

result

is

that the

overlooks

te.xt

were even vaguely considered by Morgenthau, becomes

without discussing sub-national or transnational

identities.

Instead,

the concept of the “national interest” (Morgenthau, 1960: 562) tends to engulf the concept of

identity.

Hence, an otherwise elaborate

simplistic

politics

world

and

Furthermore,

uncritical.

and human nature, which

affairs (e.g. conflict in the

impossible). This

work

is

such means of achieving
importance he accords to

I

text such as this actually reveals itself to

it

contains a rather pessimistic outlook

be

upon world

argue has contributed to present-day cynicism toward

Balkans and the suggestion that a resolution

is

almost

a strong starting-point for the self-fulfilling prophecies of IR.

this relates to

it.

The

One

Morgenthau’s analysis of the status quo and the

closest treatment of identity occurs through his brief

discussion of “nationalism” (1960: 368),

w hich

6

again tends to manifest itself as a concept

applicable to the territorial state

My

project,

however, coiicents

itself

with identities not

exclusively at the national level but at the
sub-national level as well, I’olUics

Nations

is

less useftil for

such an endeavor given that

levels of identity-based groups.
Yet

adhere

many

it

Among

hardly takes account of various

present-day practitioners of international
affairs

faithfiilly to the realist doctrine
to the point

where Morgenthau’s work becomes a

Standard IR textbook.

certainly does not aid the cause of scrutinizing
identity that

It

the primacy of power as

it

is

applied to international politics. Although
the definition and

understanding of this concept are quite murky
assert their actions

This

IS

on the basis of what

problematic, for

it

Morgenthau defends

to

it

can be seen that nation-states continue to

them are fundamental concepts, such as power.

can lead to mutual misunderstandings and exhibitions
of national

hubris in order to promote an otherwise relative
concept.

Moving \ears ahead. Theory
of neorcalism,
insistence

is

of International I^olitics, respected as the founding text

especially insensitive to the intricacies of identity because
of Waltz’

upon the “advantages” (Waltz, 1979: 161) of bipolarity

such a conception overlooks multiple and transnational
science

identities.

for a stable world.

The attempt

Again,

to create a

(1979: 7) of international politics based upon microeconomic theory and
structural

causes/factors negates the intersubjective nature of identity formation
between states and

sub-national groups, or states and other states. In a sense, such an approach
makes identity

formation almost deterministic. Similar to Morgenthau, Waltz builds his theor>’ upon
ideas

which are not

as conceptually concrete as they are presented, such as “interest” and

“power”— both of which
identities are

represented

can be redefined to demonstrate

how

manipulated by these concepts. Furthermore,

in

if

sub-national and transnational

neorealist theory as

Theory of International Politics were as logically sound as

identity formation within nation-states

would be

fact that crises such as those in the Baltics

far

more predictable than

it is

it

claimed to be,

has been. The

and Balkans have occurred implies the weakness

7

of neorcalist propositions. Distinct
periphery states would become

identities, as those

ftirther

marginalized by state efforts to take cover beneath
the

hegemonial umbrella of one of the major powers
diminishing of identity-based conflicts
followers claim that

finds an article that

—

if neorealist

is

‘'Tlie

is

ver\’

problematic

concise as

spells out

it

would be

the

its

w ith

this

some of the dominant/accepted viewpoints

assessment

it

can be seen that

maximizing. Moreover,

international affairs.

institutionalist

respect to identity politics and the politics of identity.

meaning

that state

depends upon numerous factors including those related to

rational utility

result

theory were as powerful as

Institutionalism tends to be perceived as conditionol^

institutions

The

world.

Promise of Institutionalist Theor> ” by Keohane and Martin, one

of institutionalism. However, based upon
theorv' also

in a bipolar

it is.

considering

In

possessed by members within

it

explicitly rejects the value

While frowned upon

to apply various realist principles, or to

international relations often times

is

It

self-interest

in

and

of critical appraisals of

b>' realist tenets, institutionalist theor>' still

show

valid” (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42).

engagement

‘‘under

relies

revealed as

what conditions

realist propositions are

upon an application of logic which
illogic.

With respect

seeks

in

to identity politics,

neoliberal institutionalism inadequately addresses issues related to sub-national and
transnational, as well as changing, identities. Given that institutionalism tends to focus upon

the incentives of states with respect to participation in institutions (1995: 44), one can

immediately notice the flaws of this theory
institutionalist

institution

w ith

might argue for example that no

which might heavily tamper with

institutionalism

still

its

respect to identity politics.

state

would allow

definition of their state's self-interest.

if

itself to enter into

collectivized identity or identities.

privileges the role of state self-interest this

considering issues of identity, especially

competing

identity

is

an

But since

heavily problematic

groups complicate the

EmpiricalK’ speaking, the post

8

An

WWIl

era has

when

demonstrated that

Germany

state interests

do

in faet

change. For instance, no longer do Japan or

tend to promote a militaristic agenda on the world stage (Ruggie, 1998: 863).

The following

texts represent theoretical approaches

whieh

dominant ones largely beeause the dominant approaches stand
challenging propositions.

It is

to be threatened

traditional

This t\pe of association arises when one kind of practice,
encounters another practice which poses a challenge to

its

remain subordinate

it.

in this

and the

it

their

Con

transitional.*

case an academic one,

such a scenario the dominant

In

adherents) acknowledges the presence of the emergent. However, in an

attempt to resist the emergent practice adlierents of the dominant one often

stifle

by

to the

here that one finds a “dominant/emergent” (Williams in

Davis and Schleifer, 1980; 460) relationship between the

practice (via

still

(1980: 460-461). Wlien translating this into the discourse of IR

scholars of the traditional approaches have attempted to

actually choosing to address them.

attention to the ideas

stifle

Although such scholars

propounded by

mainstream

is

to

subsume or

evident that

the transitional ones

will give

by

some credence and

their colleagues, ultimately they seek to reassert the

superiority of the traditional theoretical approaches. This

critical studies literature,

it

tr>-

literature

is

how,

in spite

of the robust

of IR has continued to retain

its

preeminence.

Ruggie, for example, introduces another dimension into the marginalization of critical
studies, or

more

specifically constructivist thought, by arguing that theorists of

IR have

maintained a highly ‘‘narrow” (Ruggie, 1998: 880) outlook on the nature of the Social
Sciences. Given the constructivist divergence from realist and neoliberal causal mechanisms

(1998: 878-880),

hesitated to

“

The tenn

it

is

welcome

“transitional”

is

apparent that scholars of the more traditional approaches have
the research of critical studies.

not meant to imply the creation of a teleology but rather a

the established discourse and

practice of international relations.

9

mo\ ement away from

World of Our Malang, Nicholas Onuf advances some of the elements
of

In

structuration^ theorv as he attempts to build a constmetivist
theorv' of ailes and aile in the
international realm.

This text

a valuable starting-point for the presentation of the idea that

is

individuals and society are mutually constitutive. Carefully,

despite this claim the process of mutual constitution

1989; 40). Such a claim

is

structuralism,

my

As

I

argue, the concept of aile also

upon binaries

am

in

its

Onuf distances himself from

it

is

work

relates

suggests that the rules by which social

a social construct

no predetennined source.

which does not possess an

order to describe the different categories of rules and

in

which there are three categories

skeptical as to whether he too has formed a

and hence

position. This

post-

meaning. Onuf explicitly rejects the rigidity created by the

Nevertheless, World of Our Making
relations,

implies that agency and

it

to abide) are social constructs with

although he posits an alternative

I

in social interactions,

treatment of identity politics, for

absolute grounding point for

291),

mind” (Onuf,

and society nonetheless do not have complete

which he accepts as a more “radical” (1989: 40)

groups abide (or are expected

reliance

that

of their self-formation. Although he agrees with the post-structuralist emphasis
of

the role played by logocentrism^

highly to

not “done wholly out of

highly applicable to this project, as

interests are not pre-given, but that individuals

command

is

Onuf warns however

SiW\c.u\dA.QS,

somewhat

And

for each (Onuf, 1989;

rigid

paradigm.

the highly constructed nature of international

assists in presenting the notion that there

about conflicts such as those based upon

rule.

is

nothing natural or inevitable

identity.

Alexander Wendt’s “Collective Identity Fonnation and the International State”
as well upon a more sociological approach to understanding international relations.

relies

It

provides much-needed attention to the concept of intersubjectivity between actors, and more

broadly addresses the role of social interaction

^

Onuf builds

upon,

in large part, stnicturalion

among

them. This essay veers from the

ihcoiy as presented by Anthony Giddens in texts such as The

Constitution of Society.
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paradigm of rational-choice acting and attempts
and

identities

to

account for the means by which actors’

their political/social choices are formed.

Moreover,

challenges neorealist

it

presuppositions about the fixed, predetermined nature of state-level interests. In this
regard

Wendt’s piece establishes a foundation

for the idea that interests

do not necessarily

fall into

a

neat, determinable set of patterns.

Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities
valuable text, as

politics

it

offers a

and nationalism

more

in the

critical

is

a tremendously

approach to understanding the nature of identity

post-Cold

War era. Composed

of numerous short essays by a

diverse array of scholars, the text challenges the primacy of the role of the territorial state in
international relations.

identity

of

is

less

It

brings to the reader’s attention the notion that the concept of

determinate than

political refugees,

it

is

over the

how

identities

is

especially so in light of the role

migrant workers and other immigrants. Challenging Boundaries

suggests that the concept of identity

have asserted/abused

believed to be. This

is

susceptible to change, and that those states

which

their

power

also have sought to privilege the identity that they prefer

of those

whom

they have dominated. Moreover, this volume analyzes

various groups of individuals have been

left

without a sense of origin or worse yet,

how

the dominant powers have attempted to “erase” (Shapiro and Alker, 1996: 270) their sense of

self

These essays help

occurring

in the

to reinforce

my

argument

that

many of the

identity-based conflicts

Balkans and Baltics have represented the efforts of dominant leaders/elites

attempting to assert the identity of those

whom

they represent over those

whom

they are

trv'ing to suppress.

The aforementioned

texts as well as the critical studies texts that

project share at least one trait in

in the international sphere.

common:

Numerous

I

rely

upon

in this

the anahsis of the role of anarchy and sovereignty

writings have struggled

or the absence of a supreme authority above nation-states.

Logoccntrisin can be understood as the pnvileging of the w ord.

11

w ith

the concept of anarchy,

Some have found

it

to

be

problematic whereas others

My contention

is

at the

that statehood

same time found have

it

to be an indispensable concept.

and anarchy mutually constitute each other. There

is

nothing natural or predetermined about the
condition of anarchy. This also reveals the
constructed, malleable nature of state sovereignty.

concept existing

m absolute

it

will

By

suggesting that sovereignty

is

not a

be argued that conflicts arising out of identity crises are

not untreatable simply because they might exist
strictly within the confines of a sovereign
state

(Wendt, 1994: 388). One cannot adequately come to define
the concept of sovereignty

without being familiar with the conditions ascribed to anarchy,
and vice versa.
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CHAPTER

3

WHY CONSTRUCTIVISM?
As Onuf s work confirms, constmctivism

not a monolithic

is

philosophical approach. Scholars have attempted to categorize

of structuralist and post-structuralist constructivism.
strict labels

relies

which suggest

that each categorv'

upon many elements of constructivism

(Onuf, 1989: 105). That

is

to say,

I

utility

Constmctivism tends

reality

is

for example,

on the basis

tiying however, to avoid these

mv

mutually exclusive. Rather,

in

an effort to adopt the role of the “bricoleur”

approach

intend to utilize various aspects of constmctivism as

my

plan

is

not based

upon a

strict,

narrow

of constmctivist thought.
to focus

upon how' a

particular discourse contributes to theory

practice, for example, in international relations.

socially constmcted

am

it,

is

they are needed throughout this project. Hence,

conception of the

I

body with One uniform

between agents

— be they

On

a basic level

it

and

accepts a reality that

individuals, groups, etc.

is

Nevertheless, this

not entirely fabricated through the complete consciousness of the actors involved

(Campbell, 1998; 24-25). The more dominant theoretical approaches such as neorealism
tend to emphasize the role of stmcture

in

determining actor expectations and behavior. This

tends to rob individuals and groups of their agency, and

determinism

to social reality.

Furthermore,

it

it

adds a strong element of

does not question the incentives/motives of

those global “powers” contributing to the dominant discourse. Hence, the nature of social

reality

simply

paradigms

due

is

treated as the one

— many w hich have

to their identity or lack

of

and only

reality,

w ithout

challenging the dominant

further constricted the freedom of groups experiencing crises

identity.

One

alternative that

I

present holds that individual

agents are more free to act than might be thought, but that their freedom

is

heavily

constrained by the practices of elites.

The

role

of the absolute versus the relative also

challenge to the traditional approaches of IR.
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is

fundamental to a constmctivist

Of course, whenever

the absolute/relative

binaiA'

is

discussed scholars tend to express strong skepticism toward the idea of relativity

the conceptual level.

They

cast

Such a conception

valueless.

as anarchy,

it

is

is

it

off as dangerously nihilistic (Dillon, 1996; 129) and

misconstrued.

By arguing

for the relativity of concepts such

suggested that those concepts which have been so caicial to the discourse of

IR have not existed as a grounding point outside of all
deconstruction (Campbell, 1998; 20) appears.

concept upon another,
importantly,

at

we

we can

tr\-

to

difference. This

By showing

is

where the

the co-dependence of

utility

one

avoid privileging one and marginalizing the other.

can recognize the social world (as

it

is

treated through concepts) as far

More
more

malleable and capable of change than the traditional approaches are willing to allow. In
respect the end result

is

of

this

a rejection of phenomena such as identity-based conflict and

nationalism as natural, inevitable or continuous. Far too

many

scholars and policymakers

lack the awareness that they have greater mobility in liberating themselves from the

paradoxes and dead-end propositions

One such

binar>' in

at

two

levels.

to

The

do

whom

this.

first

the Balkans and Baltics, and those

minorities

traditional texts.

Throughout

is

that of self7other.

Indeed, a

this research the self/other

whom

they seek to portray as the other

they have persecuted. Examples include the Serb majority in the former

in

and the ethnic Russian minority within

Western world and

its

Kosovo, and the majority of ethnic Latvians
that state\

attempt to “create” an other

Eastern Europe and the former

be explored.

^

This

upon

is

It

binaiy will

— meaning those

The second

level refers to the

regional and international forces that have created a self^other binary’. Here,

to the

number

consists of the relationship between national leaders in

Yugoslavia and the ethnic Albanian minority
in Latvia

by the

need of being “deconstructed”

of critical theorists has sought
be considered

set forth

will

USSR. But

in relation to the

I

refer primarily

inhabitants of

the role of Russia in relation to Latvia also

be crucial to e.xamine the role of alterity (See Lacan

in

must

Con Davis and

aets
not to deny that incnibers of persecuted minorities ha\ e responded by cany ing out repressive

their designated ad\ ersaries.
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Schlcifer), or

otherness”

in relation to the

formation of perceptions between sovereign

entities.

By employing

a constructivist approach to

this topic

we

are

with the suggestion that

left

national and regional leaders/elites have selected characteristics which are

than natural with respect to their engagement
there

is

in identity-based conflicts.

In other

nothing inevitable or predetermined about the choices that have been

for one group to differentiate itself from another.

However,

is

that has

prompted

leaders/elites to

choose

it

as a

do not seek

this point that the qualities associated

religion, language, customs, etc.,

that they

can be used

in

in

More

order

in

imply that

motives of such leaders/elites,

I

will

with identity, be they race, ethnicity,

have such a strong tendency

to

be readily adopted by

order to (re)create identities. Because leaders can rely upon

them out of historical

broadly, a constructivist assessment asserts itself over the traditional theoretical

b>’

forces

it

does not simply accept the existing state of international affairs as

beyond the reach of agents.

Instead,

it

seeks to analyze

as conflict have evolved, in the hope that if policy makers had a

more

same mistakes

how

critical

which

events such

understanding

the traditional

of phenomena they would be

less likely to repeat the

approaches have led them.

seeks also to address the means by which social reality

It

constructed between agents (Ruggie, 1998: 863). As a side note,

one approach not mentioned above
treatment of identitv

less

it

order to mobilize their populations.

approaches because
dictated

made

appealing about

ven,-

the historical dimensions of these variables they also can manipulate

context

to

words,

means of political mobilization. Although

this project explores in greater detail the possible

suggest at

I

an irrelevant concept. Rather, there must be something

identity

groups

more arbitrary

we would

—

that

find that

of Marxism.

Marx thought

If

to

it is

we were

is

interesting to think of

to read into a

Marxian

suggests that identity would

become

troublesome as classes and nation-states dissolve (Tucker, 1978: 488). Obviously

has yet to occur, and few can be certain that even

15

if

such dissolution could occur the

this

disappearance of nation-states would be desirable. Yet,

Marxian discourse

it

is

interesting to conceit e

offers an alternative understanding of identity

religion, race, etc., but rather

upon

status as a proletarian.
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,

of how

— one based not on

CHAPTER 4
APPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO
IDENTITY-BASED
POLITICS

What

then,

the post-Cold

conflict

is

the special utility of

War

era? Although

and nationalism,

1

my

approach with respect

do not seek

I

believe that

much

to provide a

problematic element

made

difficult

panacea for the

progress can be

constraints of the dominant theoretical approaches.

to identity-based conflict in

Common

ills

made away from
to these

of identity

the

approaches

by a narrow', pessimistic outlook.

It

is

a highly

relates to the

concept of self-interest. Realism, neorealism and institutionalism
tend to place limits upon
the

amount of mutual

presumption that

benefits to be gained in international relations because of
the

states are continuing to

advance

their

own

interests,

even

at the

expense of

others (keohane and Martin, 1995: 42-44). These schools survive
because they mislead
representatives of states

sovereignh' into believing that self-interest

the only, telos or end.

My argument

with state self-interest

is

now

much

concerns

overlook

based upon the physical

this idea,

with the notion that the preoccupation

it

state.

and hence promote the

Because

interests

which often transcend geographical borders, and

identities are not static but d\iiamic

interests solely

the foremost, if not

too excessive or at the least, misdirected.

are applying to identity-based groups

because

itself

is

will

be increasingly difficult to define

Of course policymakers and

traditional tenets of IR.

elites still

But the nation-state

is

a

fusion of two concepts; nation and state. If the primacy of nation overshadows that of state,
or vice versa,

how

severe will the political consequences

be*^

State self-interest then,

is

overvalued or misperceived. Representatives of sovereignty grasp hold of this concept as a
guiding principle, thereby bypassing any popular interests that might apply beyond the
boundaries of the physical

state.

Although the idea of the physical
incentives to stray from

“power

state

politics”.

and

The
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its

interests

cannot be cast

off, states

do have

applications of the traditional conceptions of

international relations frequently create adverse circumstances for

particular conflict.

in the

is

this

For example, the U.S./NATO coalition,

former Yugoslavia
so?

One reason

in

in

all

actors involved in a

choosing a bombing campaign

1999 actually complicated prospects for regional

relates to the uneasiness about the fhture

provinces after international forces leave Kosovo.

By

of Serbia and

refusing to pursue a

How

stability.

its

fellow

more

critical

understanding of the Balkan conflict, the U.S.AVest rejected diplomacy and further

complicated an already tense

volatile, a similar analysis applies.

ethnic Russians

in

Although the current situation

situation.

in

not as

Latvia, has contributed to a greater distancing between ethnic Latvians

ascribing pejorative qualities to the “other”

Another implication regarding the
in this

burgeoning of regional
interest, states

is

Russia, by insisting upon greater rights and protection of

and ethnic Russians (Rudenshiold. 1992: 609). This has come frequently

greater depth later

Latvia

paper,

conflicts.

is

—

i.e.

To an

role of identity-based conflict, to be considered in

that international forces also are responsible for the

In efforts to cling to tautological principles

extent this has been done

in

— not

just of the

West but

in

in

of the

By choosing

Yet, as

these troubled states

many

to define

historical hatreds, the

states in a disparaging light.

has been the work of certain regional elites/leaders

self-

order to devise an adversar\’ and

Balkan conflict within the past decade as a function of natural,
U.S.AVest have portrayed non-Western

based on

to a gross misrepresentation

perpetuate the need for an active foreign policy (Neumann, 1996: 23).

as the actual adversaries

expense of

ethnic Latvians.

from the Western world have contributed

affairs in other states.

at the

I

will argue,

who have

it

served

cases of humanity. In the case of

the Baltics, for example, Russia has sought to portray ethnic Latvians as an obstacle to the

welfare of ethnic Russians. However,

accommodate

all inhabitants

it

has not proposed any political solutions which will

of Latvia, be they ethnic Russians or ethnic Latvians.

It is

unlikely that there ever will be a foolproof vaccination against the outgrowth of international
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misperceptions so as long as media

elites,

narrow-minded diplomats^ or abusive leaders

continue pursuing their perverse agendas.
Finally, there

as a

is

a need to uncover

some

means of mobilization. Although

of timeless, historical hatreds,
information

in

I

order to generate

I

possible factors leading to the choice of identity

reject

most

identit>

-based conflicts to be the product

suspect that leaders/el ites can rely upon historical

new

conflicts.

In this regard,

is

it

my

contention that

identity-based crises in post-Communist states are not continuations
of older conflicts but
rather conflicts based

important difference.

upon
It

the belief that they are extensions of older feuds. This

is

an

suggests the strong degree to which identity-based conflicts have

been constructed by leaders/elites seeking

to

promote themselves and those

claim to represent. Hybridization has allowed

elites, in part, to

whom

thev

construct the realities of their

nation-states.

^

Consider, for e.xainple the notion that the diplomat has changed from sovereign representative

a

medium

for coin eying information betw een heads of state.
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See Luard,

ed.,

to

more of

Basic Texts in International

CHAPTER
THEORETICAL

5

BASIS: IDENTITY

AND NATIONALISM

Understanding the crux of my argument entails a
identity

and nationalism. Identity

fairly close look at the

concepts of

a concept which, in large part, allows one
body of

is

individuals to distinguish itself from another on
the basis of attributes that, as history has

demonstrated, are heavily arbitrary. In other words, there

is

nothing absolute or natural

about using religion, ethnicity or even language to explain
what identity

is.

In the context

the post-communist world ethnicity has been a
strong determinant of identity. But, as

would argue,

it

I

mistakenly has been confused as a synonym for identity. This
has allowed

regional elites to mobilize

toward survival

in the

Nevertheless,

it

is

members of their

absence of the

respective ethnicities in order to create a drive

totalitarian order.

imperative to dissect the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflict.

Walker claims, doing so requires us

to

“demolish the notion that 'ethnic

unchanging ethnic

identities

of the participants” (Walker

in

in

terms of the

Drobizheva, 19%:

3).

Rather,

and identity frequently are linked together when a particular body of political

wishes to accomplish a particular objective. Since social and/or

As

conflict' represents a

unique phenomenon or that [post-communist conflicts] are best understood

ethnicity

of

political objectives

elites

change

with time and historical context, elites often have used different criteria to impose a
specific
identity

upon various groups of people. This forces us

casts doubt

upon the idea

that ethnicity

and

to rethink the

concept of identity;

identity are historically fixed

and so

it

rigid that

they always resurface and reintroduce old conflicts. Interests change, as do identities.

One

should never overlook the primacy of historical context.

As

a side note, but nonetheless an important one, historical context can be a difficult

concept with which to deal. This results from the broadness of the conditions to which

might

refer.

It is

not

my

it

intention simply to characterize every volatile event as the product

Relations, pp. 439-442.
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of historical context, or

to

be reductionistic with respect to

importance of historical context

forward

in this writing.

deficient.

They tend

This

is

to assert a

still

to

the

remains crucial to the constructivist approach put

one area

in

which the

traditional

paradigm of predicting events

always changes over

night.

Rather,

it

approaches appear to be

in international affairs, yet

they ignore the changing d\Tiamics of historical context. This
historical context

Howe\ er,

this concept,

is

not,

of course, to claim that

can take anywhere from over night

over decades or even longer. But given the uncertainty of knowing what conditions will

arise

between and within

states,

it

is

difficult to

understand

how approaches such

as that of

the neorealists (for example) can boast of having such tremendous predictive power.
this reason, the constructivist

affairs

w ithout

relying

For

approach offers a more prudent examination of international

upon generalizations about

the actions/behavior of states or groups of

states.

As David Campbell

suggests, understanding (for example) the nature of the

formation of identity politics

rests

constructed (Campbell, 1998;

4),

upon tracing how
(In fact, this

is

identity

and the events

is

set, definitive

causes which deceivingly appear to ground meaning

part of the task of deconstruction

— an event

that

in large

concerned some of the most important concepts

identity, violence” (1998: 23).

For

if

And where

scholars adliere to the traditional acceptance of these

in

which

constructs and hence not the result of an unchangeable, natural order.

identity,

w ith

the Balkan crisis

to consider are “ethnicity, nationalism,

concepts as fixed and absolute, there will be no space allowed

presents us

in absolute.

exposes those relationships of

supplementarity which help to define our concepts (1998: 4-6).

is

“w hy”

Seeking to understand how concepts and events are constructed avoids the fixation of

searching for

This

influences are

not an entirely original claim, for the

constaictivist school of thought tends to endorse the utility of “how” over

part.)

it

the possibility of challenging the

upon w hich so much of current

The

them

alternative

assumed usage of concepts such as

conflicts rest.
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to consider

How has

been deconstructed

identity

in

order to reveal the process by which

it

has

acquired meaning? In essence, the creation of identity
has been exposed through the

conception of the self/other binary. Yet, as

(Neuman, 1996:

self

upon an arbitrary

2).

set

Identity

is

warns, there

tremendously based

is

nothing natural about the

in difference,

but difference

of characteristics or qualities such as ethnicity and

treating the matter of Balkan conflict

Muslims

Neuman

in relation to

it

will

be imperative to consider

religion.

how

is

based

When

ethnic Albanian

Orthodox Christian Serbs have been depicted as the “other” hv

elite

Serbian political leaders, a performative act which can spread
into the minds of the Serbian

masses and then be adopted as an ascendant view. Conversely,

it

can be understood that

oppressed Kosovars would adopt a similar view of Christian Serbs as the
“other”.
regard both groups would appear to celebrate their
opposites.

However, both

parties

would come

own

In this

difference but resent that of their

to ignore or

overlook a means bv which they

could be thought to have a similar identity— that of citizens of the same state or federation
(and more specifically,

With respect
acknowledge

w ho

beginning of this decade, Yugoslavs).

and identity formation,

to the self/other binarv

identity not as having

meaning on

its

own

it

is

crucial to

but rather by depending upon those

serve as the “other”. This implies that the underpinnings of identity rely upon concepts

w hich

are mutually constitutive (Campbell, 1998: 23). In relation to the subject of the

Kosovo

crisis, then,

upon each other
and

until the

one can see that Christian Serbs and ethnic Albanian Muslims depend

to define

rejects the claim that

w ho

they are. Tliis denies each ethnicity superiority over the other

by virtue of w ho these people are

irreconcilable and hence must lead to bitter feuds.

their differences naturally are

Similarly, ethnic Latvians acquire their

identity vis-a-vis the presence of ethnic Russians within

and outside of Latvia, and vice

versa.

However,

in spite

of the

visibility

of these ideas

at the

conceptual level, the process

of identity formation does not always allow those whose identity
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is

being formed to realize

—

how

they gain their identity. The end result often times tends
to be an inclination toward

referencing the “others” as “strangers” (Neuman, 1996;

of this event can be dangerous

From

if the

other

is

deemed a

1).

1

Furthermore, the implications

culprit, or

a more e.xternal perspective, meaning that of the U.S. and

be taken into consideration
other” (1996: 23). If this

is

that, regretfully, “foreign policy is

more

explicitly,

NATO

countries,

it

should

generally about making an

perhaps scholars and policymakers need to be

so,

an enemy.

made aware of

the dangers behind estranging themselves from the Serbs and their
governmental leaders

an action which potentially could hinder any Western-based peace
Nationalism also has played a role

War world.

In the Balkans, for

nnth” (Denitch, 1994:
political construct.

1

it

it

in relation to identity politics in the

post-Cold

has been intertwined with the Serbian “national

For the sake of this analysis nationalism

17).

is

to

be taken as a

does not by necessity represent the sentiment that a group of people,

It

through race or ethnicity,
entitled to defend

example,

initiatives.

is

synon> mous with a particular geographical entity and therefore

A

at all costs.

more

careful look reveals that nationalism largely

is

the

product of past political events or issues revived for “contemporary political goals”

(Campbell, 1998: 86).

which represents

in

If this

is

must be realized not as a phenomenon

absolute the claims of one group of people over those of another. In the

case of the fomier Yugoslavia

Serbian political/governmental

mentioned about

so, then nationalism

this

when

I

treat the matter

of nationalism as a concept relied upon by

elites to rally their

discussing

how

“own”

against the Kosovars.

More

will

be

domestic actors have shaped identity politics and

fueled recent conflicts.

Concerning sovereignty,

it

too

is

better understood as a social construct. This

challenges older assumptions which look toward some transcendental element of sovereignty

to characterize

is

it

as unchangeable.

socially constaicted as

it

2-3) between nation-states.

is

However, as Biersteker and Weber explain, sovereignty

created via “mutual recognition” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996:

The cmx of the sovereignty
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issue resides in the question of

whether

it

exists in relation to a particular

group of people, the

territorial

space which the>

inhabit (1996: 2), or something entirely
different. Wlien relating this to the
topic of Balkan
conflict, analyzing sovereignty

is

important

a people, the Serbs and the Kosovars (and

by virtue of a shared
Understanding

world

entails

territory, or to

how

identity

acknowledging

some

in

questioning whether

it

belongs to the Serbs as

provincial peoples of the former Yugoslavia)

all

other political entity

and nationalism have been fabricated

that the presence of multiple groups

in the

post-communist

of different

identities in a

given state does not mean that mutual intolerance
naturally will occur. Diverse groups
coexisted and

still

do

in

various regions of the world despite differences in
religion,

ethnicity, language, culture, etc.

Beginning to understand

been made problematic does not always demand
to

observe

how

these concepts have

become

way

that

it

breeds nationalistic

calls.

that

salient.

than the era of the Soviet Union itself to study

such a

Ime

how

we

how

identity

and nationalism have

search far back across the centuries

Rather, one need not

identity politics has

go

further back

been catalyzed

in

Explosions of ethnic conflict have been

erroneously portrayed. Distinct bodies of people have lived amongst one another

in the post-

Communist world, man>’ mixed

refusing to

explode or

react.

w hich

Union,

to

politics

w ill

I

together like two different chemical

One

catalyst to consider

w ill

first

give

my

is

that

attention.

compounds

of cthnofederalism within the Soviet

The next e.xample of the nature of identity

be illustrated through the case of Latvia with respect to cthnofederalism.
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CHAPTER 6
SOVIET ETHNOFEDERALISM
As a

tool for the “...politicization

of ethnicity” (Roeder, 1991: 197),

this practice

ultimately arranged for tensions to occur within those republics designated
to be different by
virtue

of ethnicity. Essentially, ethnofederalisni was a means by which

Sov'iet political elites

sought to organize their regime by preventing the pursuit of industrial growth from
being
hindered by potential inter-group

Members of the numerous

rivalries.

indeed be represented at the national

However, there was a catch

level.

different ethnicities across the various states

occur through officially-appointed leaders

form of politics
203).

From a

that

would be

Soviet states

would receive

who were

sensitive to the

to this.

Groups of

representation, but this

strictly

w ould

would

forbidden from practicing a

w ill of those w hom

they represented (1991:

speculative standpoint, Russia’s actions have represented a desire to regain

its

power, prestige and imperialistic-like authority.

With
interests

ethnofederalisni,

it

can be seen that the inadequate representation of the

of different ethnic groups prevented individuals w

developing agendas that conflicted w

who

did represent their respective regions were transformed from etlmic representatives to

elite

w ith

members^ whose

ith

Soviet ideology.

objectives no longer aimed at addressing the particularities of states

diverse bodies of individuals. In turn, these officials institutionalized ethnicity in the

political sphere,

making way

for

what eventually would become ethnic

particular groups to vie for their interests, they

members who were
well for

some

w ho became

elites

were obliged to defer

in large part responsible for allocating resources.

ethnic groups

Although, other national

those

groups from

Simultaneously, the leaders

party

’

ithin these

elites,

it

rivalries.

In order for

to their elite party

Although

this

worked

constrained minority groups from pursuing objectives in the

who were

not appointed by the

by the authority of the

party.
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communist

party, continued to coe.xist

w ith

same fashion (Roeder,

1991: 206). This ftirther heightened the potential for
conflict with the

impending dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Because national

were seen

political elites

to

be the authorities capable of prox iding

ethnic and identity-based groups with resources, Soviet states
increasingly

w ho

groups

associated nationalism

w ith

How'

survival.

ethnofederalism was to prevent inter-group

conflicts'^

is

fell

this so, if the intent

victim to

of

Essentially, the Soviet system of

ethnofederalism provided no means by which sub-national or even international groups

could interact with each other politically so as
Instead, identity-based groups

(Batt and

Wolczuk, 1998:

became dependent upon looking upward
Hence

94).

encouraged action through

to bargain or negotiate for their objectives.

to

communist

elites

the Soviet system, consciously or unconsciously,

calls for nationalism as

opposed

to interetlmic negotiations or

agreements. In some instances, the Soviet system fabricated even greater ethnically-based
conflicts by leading sub-national groups to believe that they constituted and

of their

own

nation-state: ‘‘the

communist

federal system

ethnic groups which had previously been unaware

of,

were deserving

had even created nations out of

or uncertain as to their political

identity” (1998: 94-95).

How' then, did Soviet ethnofederalism provide
of communism triggered ethnic

rivalries

and

calls for

for the conditions

nationalism?

which w ith the

fall

One such means

concerns the former communist leaders themselves. With the creation of independent,
sovereign republics communist leaders

were forced

whom

who were once

to look elsew here for support.

loyal to the Soviet

By appealing

communist party

to the nationalistic calls

of those

they represented, these officials reinforced the perception that ethnic assertions and

reliance

upon nationalism were justifiable means

the Soviet

Union such leaders were

represented.

With

for engaging in politics.

far less accountable to those

whom

the creation of independent republics, however, they

some means of acquiring

support.

During the era of

they (supposedly)

w ere

required to find

Introducing a nationalistic ideology was a strong
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mechanism

many

for rallying the confidence of those groups

they sought to represent. In

cases this included an association with more extreme
nationalist groups

encompassed

racist attitudes tied

Moreover, there
elites

whom

is

whose

beliefs

with ethnic pride (Batt and Wolczuk, 1998: 95).

evidence that

were acquiring more power prior

in

a multitude of former Soviet republics national

to the fall

of communism. As

continued to mobilize the groups that they represented

in

this occurred, they

order to compete for important

resources from the central communist party. Increasingly, minority
groups failed to obtain

adequate representation and often suffered from insufficient resource allocation

(e g.

Jews)

(Roeder, 1991. 206). Furthermore, the mobilization of different ethnic groups transformed

many of these

collectivities into “interest” (Glazer

and Moynihan quoted

203) groups, again suggesting that the notion of identity

is

in

Roeder, 1991:

malleable and subject to

manipulation.

In retrospect, Soviet ethnofederalism serv'ed as a highly divisive

different identity-based groups.

Although

it

seemingly prevented volatile conflicts

throughout most of the existence of the Soviet Union, ultimately
the

USSR. But upon

dissolution of the

means of organizing

communist

it

contributed to the

fall

of

order, the legacy of Soviet

ethnofederalism established a situation whereby a number of republics faced challenges
created by the political structure of the totalitarian order (although

not

all

former Soviet republics have suffered from heated ethnic
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it

must be realized

conflicts).

that

CHAPTER
ETHNIC CONFLICT
With respect
exists a

to the role

of the Soviet Union greatly influenced

And

again,

it

is

political

stake.

and economic

elites,

how

this

in the

especially

in Latvia, there

record suggests once again that the behavior

etlinic conflict

was/has been constructed

necessarv to reiterate the argument that

namely, that identity-based conflicts

by

LATVIA

IN

of identity-based conflict and nationalism

mixed record of results. However,

former republics.

7

regions

when

I

am

I

am

in its

advancing;

studying usually have been shaped

material or security interests have been at

But as the case of Latvia also suggests, ethnic conflicts and drives

for nationalism are

anything but the product of natural, irremediable forces and causal factors. As Rudenshiold
claims, “independence in the Baltics has been no panacea,” but rather a potential ethnic

problem based on a “...strong Soviet legacy” (Rudenshiold, 1992: 609). Again,

this

reinforces the notion that ethnic conflicts in the post-communist world are not by any

natural, but rather the product of decisions

(Although,

I

made during

the reign of totalitarianism.

disagree with Rudenshiold's description of ethnic conflict as having been

rejuvenated.

Perhaps a better temi would be “constituted” or “reconstituted”

Latvia currently consists of a roughly

fifty-fifty split

non-indigenous individuals, with a recent increase
613-614). During the era of the Cold

its

means

War the

in

)

between ethnic Latvians and

ethnic Russians (Rudenshiold, 1992;

Soviet Union sought to establish industries in

various regions, a maneuver which spawned an increase in Russian migration to the area.

This approach was followed by a general Soviet unwillingness to encourage ethnic
integration

in Latvia.

among

To

date,

the population.

many

enormous complexities have

example, legislation
strictly

Instead,

at the national level

closely-knit Russian collectivities

formed

arisen as a result of this arrangement.

For

has been infused with efforts to promote objectives

coinciding with the interests of ethnic Russians. However, ethnic Latvians have of

course responded with countermeasures of their own, such as efforts to make their language
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the official national language. This in turn
has prompted Russian reactions, creating
a

vicious cycle of activity (1992: 609).

Wlio or what then has been responsible
especially since the

and

rivalries

fall

A

of the Soviet Union?

calls for nationalism to

for this precarious situation in Latvia,

be rooted

in

simplistic analysis,

w hich assumes

ethnic

unending histories does not account for

such a case. Once again, w e must focus on those
elites/communist party members
heavily responsible for constructing the present situation

in Latvia.

Upon

who were

creating the

conditions that allowed Russians to migrate into Latvia the
communist party refused to

encourage

full integration,

incapable of change. But

thus projecting the images of ethnicity and identity to
be rigid and

it

is

quite evident that in the matter of Russia and Latvia their

peoples have not shared a deeply-rooted, ancient historical conflict which
translates into

unchanging disputes.

inevitable,

In

terms of manipulating one population against or

of Russia and the Baltics

calls to

mind what

I

in

opposition to another, the case

refer to as “passive mobilization”.

In the era

of Stalin, one finds a tremendous amount of propaganda made by the Soviet leader

w ith

the

intent of embellishing Russian characteristics over those belonging to inhabitants of
the

satellite states.

throughout the

were tr>ing

On

various occasions Stalin tried to assert the superiority of Russian qualities

USSR. This placed

to protect

and maintain

by “passive mobilization”

I

mean

a heavy strain upon

their

own

that the

members of the

cultural practices (Vizulis, 1985: 94).

attitudes

of superiority evolve over the years

Russians

in the

Yet, how-

many of them understand

Hence,

Russian population learned to differentiate

from the other through indoctrination sponsored by a minority of cultural and

As

who

Baltic states,

it

becomes

itself

political elites.

easier to understand

how

present might support nationalist rhetoric which presents others as inferior.

the intense struggles

underw ent by members of the

Baltic states (such as Latvia) in order to retain their cultural characteristics in the face of

threats generated

by a nation with imperialistic ambitions? Passive mobilization, then.
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reduces to the idea that members of the population do not necessarily
have to engage

arduously

in nationalist activity to

acquire a pro-nationalist outlook or support for nationalist

policies.

A

further effect of the Russian perspective on Latvia and the Baltics
has been the

historical creation

95).

Given

of the classification “[sovereign]

that scholars have readily

these two entities,

Soviet Union and

it

state or

acknowledged

Russian colony” (Vizulis, 1985:

the categorizing of Latvia as

noteworthy that the actions of political

is

now

in the

integrity of Baltic states.

elites

one of

during the era of the

Russian Federation have attempted to de-legitimize the

But

this is largely

what

my

writing has been about; namely, the

construction of political identity as a concept which depends upon another concept for

meaning. Latvians are not inherently “colonists”. Rather, the decisions of political, cultural

and economic
identity.

A

elites in

more

Russia have contributed to the conflision behind recognizing Latvian

critical

understanding of the d\ namics of identity

consider the motives of leaders

in

Russia and

how

in

Latvia requires one to

leaders in Latvia have responded.

usage of mutually exclusive categories such as colony/sovereign

state invites itself to

The
be

deconstructed.

The Latvian case

also

the diaspora in the post-Cold

is

a strong reminder of the attention given to the concept of

War

world. Given the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the

creation of successor states throughout the region has bolstered scholarly examinations of

bodies of people with shared origins

who

are living

away from

the homeland. This might

lead individuals to accept that the existence of diasporas will likely create volatile situations

throughout the former communist

states.

one body of individuals with a common
that the

home

state actively will

Consider
identity, has

this

tr\'

to

But

is

this

always the case? Does the presence of

heritage, living outside of

advance the

interests

of

statement from Charles King and Neil

J.

its

its

homeland, necessitate

people?

Melvin: “Politics, not

been the major determinant of when and how successfully foreign policy has
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reflected existing ethnic linkages” (King

and Melvin, 1999:

that issue-areas based

identity

on factors such as

118),

Their research suggests

do not inevitably yield active measures

taken by the homeland. Rather, a more specific political
motive has to exist
state to

become

seriously involved in monitoring the welfare of

its

“own”

in

order for one

living in the

abroad. Economic incentive might account for part of this motive.
If Russia believes that

its

migrants to Latvia can fare well abroad and not pose a direct burden to the
suffering Russian

economy,

Or

if

might encourage the advancement of the

it

Russia

investment
abroad.

itself believes that ethnic

in Latvia,

it

Rudenshiold).

And

its

to protect the interests

become more

even Russia has

its

population living

is

in its

in

possession a consensus as to

One, for example, includes the idea that

are.

similar to Western Europe.

conception of Europe

As Neumann warns, though,

it

wishes to

the Russian

highly subjective and to a large extent has been created by Russians

themselves (Neumann, 1996:
certain politicians

But with the specter of Soviet imperialism

2).

and opportunists

in

Russia,

great concern for the affairs of ethnic Russians living

the

of

ambitions to revive old imperialistic pursuits (See

yet, ironically, not

more ambitious goals

amongst

in Latvia.*

another factor compelling Russia to scrutinize the conditions of Russians

Still

its

of ethnic Russians

Russians can contribute to better prospects for foreign

might be inclined

Latvia simply might relate to

what

interests

it

is

still

alive

not surprising that there

in states

which used

to

is

such

form parts of

USSR.
This

Soviet

last

statement

is

not especially difficult to accept,

communism. Consider

in light

passage by King and Melvin:

this

The So\ iet Union, although supposedly based on

the

w ithering away of etlmic

allegiances, privileged etluiicity as a source of individual identity

of group

solidarity...

of the legacy of

Both

and a focus

indi\’iduals (tlirough etlmic designations

on internal

passports) and entire populations (tlirough the administrati\ e stmeture of the state)

w ere

*

Although

this is

defined by their etlmic pro\ enance

somew hat

speculative,

it

is

meant

—a form of identic

that

was

itself in

many

to suggest that there are other alteniati\es to

understanding the nature of identity -based disputes.
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cases consciously constnicted by Soviet ethnograpliers, linguists, and
historians in
Uie early years after the Bolshex ik Revolution. (King and Mel\ in,
1999; 117 )

Again, the dy namics of etlmofedcralism are revealed. More importantly,

passage

this

demonstrates some of the means by which identity was constructed by past Soviet
regimes.

Of course,

it

is

not likely that such regimes gave equal attention to ethnic Russians living

within the various Soviet territories. As the current situation

more

intensely politicized

interests

between

itself

when

a state such as Russia

and another

state.

is try

in

Latvia implies, identity

is

ing to exercise particular

The measures taken by

individuals such as

ethnographers and linguists during the Soviet era confirm the degree of effort behind
attempts to

fulfill

imperialistic drives and ambitions.

However

as represented by a certain elite body, to act on behalf of

intervention will not necessarily occur (1999:

disputes/conflicts

do not

arise

1

16).

its

if

it

is

not

in

a state's interest,

ethnic population living abroad,

This suggests that identity-based

by virtue of natural forces or inevitable sequences of events.

Successor states such as Latvia also serve as

entities

helping to reinforce the Russian

post-Soviet identity. With the presence of ethnic Russians living abroad, the homeland can

boast of being a regional power with deep trans-border ethnic

Although

120).

state,

it

this

does not necessarily hint

at

ties

(King and Melvin, 1999:

Russian ambitions to restore an imperialistic

suggests a drive toward establishing a culturally dominant Russia elevated above the

new post-communist

In this respect, diaspora politics

countries.

have been an

“invention” (1999; 120) used to provide direction to Russian regimes

War

uncertainties.

Hence, one finds a

partial explanation for

in light

elitist

of post-Cold

maneuvers taken by figures

such as fonner President Yeltsin on behalf of Russian populations living outside of the

Russian Federation. In sum,

homeland interventions

it

is

striking to note, as

King and Melvin have done,

for the sake of an ethnic minority

particular political motive arises.

that

do not necessarily occur unless a

Conversely, attachment toward the homeland does not
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necessarily arise without a particular political or economic
motive; not simply

some obscure

sense of loyalty toward the physical state of origin.

Before proceeding,

Thus

far

wealth,

ow n

I

my

have used the term

whose

discussion of elites must be extended and further explained.

to refer to a minority

interests reside in perpetuating their

state or across borders.

such as legislators

(at all,

Speaking

in

of individuals, usually of great material

ow n

status

contemporary terms,

w ithin

the confines of their

elites consists

of individuals

but especially the national level), governmental executives,

judiciaiy figures and other governmentally elected/appointed officials. However,
elites do

not necessarily have to be directly involved

their status.

A

exercises

interests

its

number of elites such
by virtue of

individual lobbying efforts.

But

its

w ith government on any

level in order to retain

as individuals of the business class or intelligentsia also

relative

elites also

power

either as a voting bloc or through

could consist of prominent celebrities or

figureheads of popular culture. If we were to assess the nature of elites
past

we w ould

still

existed.

find that they consisted of

In the case

earlier in the

20'*’

members of the

nobility,

in the

w herever

more

distant

a noble class

of Latvia a number of nobles under the Russian regime of Kerensky,

century, acted to complicate the prospects for creating a lasting, sovereign

Latvian state (Kaslas, 1976: 50). Interestingly, while the ''...Russian intellectual class

sympathized w ith the Latvian people, the

local nobility

suppressed [them] with so

much

violence” (1976: 48).

A

presence of multiple identity-based groups

in states

such as those of the Baltics

also yields mindfulness toward the concept of national "fitness” (Clemens,

1994: 185). This term refers to a group’s

and customs
been quick

—

to

essentially,

measure the

Some have found

its

abilitj’ to

maintain

its

Jr. in

Szporluk,

cultural practices, features

shared memories and lifestyles (1994: 185). Scholars have

level

of fitness for indigenous groups

that despite threats

in states

such as Latvia.

from the Russian homeland Latvia has maintained

sense of national fitness. The other side of this matter, however,

33

is

applicable to ethnic

its

Russians

in

Latv ia. With the creation of a sovereign Latv ian state

w hat

are the dynamics of

ethnic Russians’ sense of fitness?

Wliat this suggests

is

that the

awareness of concepts such as national fitness actually

can contribute to divisiveness between different identity-based groups.
Again, the attempt
here

is

w hich
states

not to be culturally insensitive but to strive toward an understanding of
the state

can encompass multiple ethnicities,

we

etc.

When w e examine

the case of the Baltic

find that concerns over reconciling the existence of multiple identity-based
groups

have been motivated by the political changes of the post-Cold

War

world.

In a sense,

one

could rely upon Biblical analogies to address these changes: similar to the awareness brought
to

Adam

fruit,

and Eve of being unclothed

ethnic Russians

in

influenced by elite Russian figures

How ever,

affairs has

members of different

this

My

after partaking of the forbidden

awareness

w ho have attempted

of the dissolution of the USSR.

post-communist

Garden of Eden

made aw are of their

Latvia have been

the protection of the Soviet regime.

light

in the

point here

is

w ithout

largely a construction

of ethnicity

that the highly politicized nature

intrastate compatibility

ethnic groups in states such as Latvia.

Szporluk, 1994: 196)

Jr. in

is

to politicize the role

endangered the prospects for

Russian citizenship (Clemens,

precarious position

As a

result, drives

in Baltic states

in

of

between

tow ard ethnic

have become

complex, dense issue-areas furthering regional tensions and misunderstandings.
Far from having solved

its

experienced some promising trends

ethnic and nationalistic dilemmas, Latvia, however, has

w ith

respect to the coexistence of Russians and Latvians.

For example, the better employment opportunities presented
provided them with fewer reasons to

feel antagonistic

they might have to interact. There also
figures have sought to promote

is

the presence of ethnic Russians (Clemens,

efforts in

Jr. in

whom

indicating that Latvian political

contending with issues created by

Szporluk, 1994: 196). This has been

especially true with the granting of independence to Latvia, given
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Russians have

toward ethnic Latvians with

some evidence

more peaceful

to migrating

its

convictions about

how

It

was

illegitimately

annexed

to the Soviet

614). Hence, although Latvia

that the

end of Soviet Union

is

far

from having solved

it

its

War

(Kaslas, 1976: 613-

identity-based problems, the fact

prompted some feelings of

initially

demonstrates the profound effect

Union before the Cold

relief for Latvia

had on constructing ethnic conflicts and

nationalism. This adds another dimension to the

phenomenon of ethnic

calls for

conflict in the post-

communist world.

Now, however,

the Soviet legacy continues to plague “transition” states such as

Latvia because despite the demise of the Soviet Union

fomier central

its

state (i.e. Russia)

refuses to alleviate the tensions caused by issues of ethnicity and nationalism.

although Latvia
relentlessly

Yeltsin

is

no longer

tied to a central authority

draws attention from Russia

made appeals

against Latvia

in

itself

In

its

For example,

population of ethnic Russians

1992 the Russian government under Boris

order to protect ethnic Russians from what

it

perceived as laws discriminating against them (Drobizheva, 1996: 140).

Might the Russian government have a plausible case? Quite possibly. However, the
point here

is

that actions taken during the Soviet era have continued to complicate ethnic

relations throughout

post-communist

states.

These actions also have contributed

to a

narrow

conception of ethnic conflict as something concrete and absolute which must be treated as

it

were incapable of being assuaged. Moreover, evidence

exists

if

which suggests how national

leaders such as Yeltsin himself have appealed to stereot\pical representations of non-

Russians

Latvia.

in

order to mobilize public sentiments against former communist states such as

And by no means have

these efforts been limited to attitudes toward the Baltics

(Drobizheva, 1996: 140). They imply that current political
their populations in a period of

Cold

War

economic,

political

elites

and social

have sought

instability

—

to mobilize

that

is,

the post-

era.

The foregoing discussion of ethnofederalism
specifically, in Latvia, reveals

how

in the

Soviet Union and

more

the politics of identity and nationalism do not represent
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forces grounded with the beginning of time or the
politically constructed

promote particular

by economic and

interests.

As

I

modern world. Rather, they often

political elites

would argue,

the opportunity to think critically about their

— a minority of individuals seeking

var\- rarely

own

are

histories.

to

have identity-based groups had
But would the previous

discussion also apply to “transition” states that are more notorious for the presence of
bitter
ethnic conflict, such as those of the Balkans? With this question in mind
analysis of the Yugoslav situation since the end of the
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communist

order.

I

turn

now

to

an

CHAPTER

8

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND NATIONALISM: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
On

the surface

intimidated

in the

can be seen

when given

Balkans

an effort

it

how

students, scholars and polics

a chance to analyze the problems of ethnic conflict and belligerence

— especially with regard

to describe the

makers would be

to the

dynamics of ethnic

former Yugoslavia.

A

conflict in the Balkans,

number of historians,

have presented current

identity-based crises as the product of mutual hatreds dating back to the

Medieval Serbian Empire, for example, has been
that the

cited as an

Balkans will be forever tainted by endless ethnic

referred to dated conflicts between

in

13*^

The

century.

epoch contributing

to the notion

Moreover, historians have

strife.

Muslims and Christians as a source of the problems

which have revealed themselves since

the end of the

Cold

War

(Samar\', 1995: 36). In the

introduction to his edited volume, Larrabee narrowly assumes that the conclusion of the

Cold

War

has “unleashed long-submerged historical antagonisms” (Larrabee, 1994:

xii) in

the Balkans. This statement constrains the potential for an innovative outlook on affairs in

Hence

the region.

the

title

of his volume. The Volatile Powder Keg, analogizes Balkan

ethnic/identity-based conflict as the product of “chemical” instability,

How
during the

accurate

life

is

this interpretation,

As Samar>'

hostilities

vast

amount of diversity.

also leads us

away from acceptance of the

If anything, the onset

in the

Balkans (Samaiy, 36: 1995).

belief that by virtue of being

Christian/Serb or Albanian/Muslim (for example), ethnic conflicts and drives toward
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of the

leads us toward a better

it

understanding of the historical origins of etlinic conflict

it

critical analysis reveals that

which have consumed the Balkans during

nation-stale and the identities constructed by

However,

will.

suggests, the Serbian Empire actually experienced a tremendous

amount of success while possessing a

modern

more

you

of the Medieval Serbian Empire, Christians and Muslims were quite capable

of coexisting without demonstrating the
the 1990's.

A

however?

if

nationalism occur as naturally as do the elements. But there

is

no “Periodic Table” of ethnic

hostilities.

Banac, for e.xample, makes an assumption contrary'
writing with regard to identity-based conflict.

He

to the

approach taken

infuses the role of ideology

in this

and competing

nationalist groups, but he de-emphasizes the special role played by regional
and national
elites.

level

Although

I

am

of the masses,

I

sympathetic to his efforts to locate more political accountability

at the

understand Banac to neglect those forces which have manipulated the

masses on the basis of phenomena such as nationalism/nationality.

In

one sense, he

convolutes the process by which ethnic and identity-based conflicts develop. Far too rigid

an element of causality

is

injected,

producing a model such as the following: the presence of

different identity groups in a specific area yields political incompatibility,

conflict,

which yields

by

efforts

By focusing upon

elites to

cope with such conflict (Banac, 1984:

to piece together or reconstruct the origins

nationalist tendencies in the present (Banac, 1984: 12). Nevertheless,

First,

Banac toys with

Certainly,

to understanding

it

how

would be implausible

assume blindly

stems from a clean progression of events

set into

Finally,

Banae removes much

in

For the sake of keeping

their position elites

do

in fact

my

argument consistent,

recently.

I

is

from the “special

interests”

at the national or sub-national

maintain that

require the attention of the masses.

in

order to secure

However,

this

“need”

often represents the need to manipulate them in order to promote perverse interests.
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complex

1918. Historieal regression and

political accountability

(Banac, 1984: 29) of elites seeking to assert their position

level.

arise

Balkan conflict within recent years

that

motion

more

progression do occur, contributing to the means by which identity-based conflict

fabricated.

of

Moreover, he introduces a heavily linear

identity-based tensions have arisen

to

two problems

the idea of locating present-day feuds in a

historical record (though not an ancient one).

component

12).

a brief but important period of history in Yugoslavia (1918-1921),

Banac’s effort could be deemed an attempt

with this attempt.

which yields

Essential 1\’,

what authors such as Banac and Larrabec are doing

is

providing a more

descriptive account of ethnic conflict in the Balkans.
Yet, their intentions include

explanation as well. In their efforts to achieve this they
inadvertently have favored the

element of description.

How

accounting for phenomena or
a

is

this so?

try

Explanation usually entails some means of

how/why

ing to justify

number of authors has demonstrated deficiency

in

it

has or does occur.

conflict as forces driving other events such as

war

bellicose policies.

explaining

phenomena such

in

here where

accounting for the “how” aspect of

analyzing phenomena. Both Banac and Larrabee, for example,

But they do not succeed

It is

cite nationalist

and ethnic

or choices by national leaders to execute

how

national elites manipulate

as ethnic conflict. Therefore, listing off events such as ethnic conflict
or

nationalism describes the byproducts of political activity but does not account for
the process

by which events are influenced. To put
conflict

and nationalism drive Balkan

resulting from leaders

With
and eventual

this in

fall

useful reference

this

another way,

instability,

whose decisions stand

because

is

inadequate to claim that ethnic

in actuality

they are

mind, a good starting point might consist of asking

that provided

phenomena

to generate instability.

of the communist order contributed
is

it

how

the existence

to recent tensions in the Balkans.

by Crawford and Lipschutz, who argue

A

that “exclusive

and

oppositional identities are politically constructed during periods of upheaval by eertain

members of political and economic

elites”

(Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 168).

In the

context of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic and identity -based conflicts are not necessarily the
result

of different ethnic groups consciously choosing

to live in separate territorial spaces.

After the Second World War, for example. Marshal Tito established a number of provinces

based upon different ethnic groups. This maneuver, however, was
political

choice

made

in

to a large extent a

order to augment support for his political party.

provinces delegating allegiance to Tito would

in turn receive greater financial assistance.

time progressed throughout the Cold War, income disparities
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Any of the new

w ithin

the provinces

As

—
influenced the onset of inter-ethnic competition for the sake of scarce
resources (1997;
171).

Hence, Tito and

By

regime fabricated a

his

political tool out

of ethnicity and

1

70-

identity.

establishing different etlinic territories in Yugoslavia Tito did not act upon
a

natural inclination toward

what was necessarily most

practical.

Rather, his actions reveal the

creation of different provinces on the basis of ethnicity to be more of an arbitrary
decision.

By

arbitraiy

it

is

meant

that Tito could

to construct his provinces.

War Yugoslavia

relied

upon other

characteristics or elements

Neither ethnicity nor political identity necessarily are the most

appropriate means of revising political

Cold

have

territories.

Furthermore, until the

latter

did not suffer from the same degree of ethnic conflict

portion of the

now

taking

place in the Balkans (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 170). Once again, although the

communist order seemingly prov ided
ethnic groups,

it

day

Still,

conflicts.

been fueled

how

can be seen

in the

for general stability

decisions

the understanding of

Balkans

is

made

how

in its

amongst members of different

time also have contributed to present-

ethnic conflict and nationalist drives have

incomplete. Thus far

1

have attempted to demonstrate

how

current ethnic conflicts do not necessarih' follow a perfect linear progression of historical

hatreds and disputes.

political elites

But

it

is

also necessary to

examine how contemporary regional

have contributed to ethnic disputes currently plaguing the Balkans.

One argument maintains
such as those of Serbia

(i.e.

that, in light

of the end of the Cold War,

political elites

Milosevic and his ruling faction) have initiated conflicts with the

“other” in order to advance their political position and the resources of their respective

provinces.

As

institutional strength in states such as Serbia has diminished, political leaders

have sought to bolster

their

power and

treat their

much-needed resources. This has revealed

economic hardships by seeking access

itself in practices

to

such as ethnic cleansing

especially given the resource-rich regions of Yugoslavia such as those in northern Kosovo.

Because of the means by which Serb provinces have been constaicted, over-ambitious
leaders such as Milosevic have used the concept of identity to mobilize their citizens against
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those

who

are unlike them, such as etlmic Albanian

Muslims (Crawford and Lipschutz,

1997: 176).

Hence,

in the

case of the Balkans

it

can be seen that ethnic conflict does not become

ethnic conflict until regional elites decide for

professionals in Bosnia

Western scholars

made

for

who

at the start

them not

it

become

to

of the Bosnian war earlier

Consider, for example,

this

in the hills’ ”

seen that even

assumed

to characterize the conflict as a purely ethnic one.

when

(Woodward

elites

decide

in

how

Drobizheva, 1996:

to define the nature

In this

17).

of a certain

that such a definition will be universally accepted. This

acknow ledge the various bodies of individuals involved
course, the political regime and

its

upon which engagement

in

Then

leaders.

a society comprised of professionals,

a conflict

is

w orkers,

is

etc.

who do

And

w hen

worked and shared similar

point here

is

in

the

social interests

that adopting a certain attitude

political leaders

—

to

yet in

many

all.
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cases

to their elites

-based conflicts

adopt a militant

whom

spirit

in

toward

they once

April 1999).

My

to be a function of the fears instilled

it

is

difficult to

defy the stances of

one's political leaders, especially in times of conflict which are not even completely

understood by

of

more

was publicized

{CNN/Headlwe News 25

such as Milosevic. In other words,

is

are most

identit\

same Kosovars with

seems more

There

But there also

remain loyal

1999, a report

of a Serb family stated that they w ould have
living along their border

not to be

leaders will be, often times,

elite

bombing of Serbia

is

important to

is

who

Unfortunately, those

justified.

are capable of recognizing the contradictions in policy choices

Kosovar Albanians

it

it

can be

not equally accept the basis

to

w hich members

conflict,

why

even the most easily influenced groups such as peasants forced

by

Many

it

in a particular conflict.

susceptible to accepting the justification behind a certain conflict.

are used to justify war. During the

mamier

there are the militar> forces.

impressionable and least inclined to challenge their

lived,

decade pleaded with

reference to mutual, inter-ethnic coalitions which were at war with “
‘those outsiders,

those thugs

is

prevalent.

Even

absence of immediate

in the

members of his
whose

conflict, political elites

ruling party are capable of stirring up
popular sentiments against

identity they designate to be different.

Just prior to the fall of

supports the notion that Milosevic himself made
efforts to

Albanian Muslims. This was done by
adliering to the

the Serb

such as Milosevic and the

Muslim and

Orthodox Church

his exaggeration

Christian faiths.

ftirther

members

communism, evidence

estrange his ‘people” from

of the differences between those

manner, he was capable of embellishing

In this

for the purpose of energizing Serb nationalism
(Crawford

and

Lipschutz, 1997. 177). For Milosevic, this allowed him to
legitimize his later convictions
against

members of different

But taken by

religious difference

itself,

onset of regional hostilities.

through the use of a
Interestingly,

conflicts

framed

(Woodward

Some

is

L.

Woodward

is

responsible for mobilizing the masses

such as religion.

asks

why post-communist

states tend to

have

their

terms of ethnicity and nationalism, as opposed to economic perils

Drobizheva. 1996: 28). As

in

rarely a necessaix' or sufficient condition for the

force usually

political instalment,

Susan
in

ethnic groups, as has been revealed most recently in
Kosovo.

I

would argue, one response

nationalism appear to be more salient because ever\ one

is

at

some

is

level

that ethnicih’

compelled

and

to

accept/reject or search for a particular identity. This encourages political elites to rely upon
ethnicitN'

and nationalism because

the\’

seem

masses. Obviously, relying upon economic

to elicit

strife is

more passionate responses from the

a great mobilizing mechanism.

since most of the post-communist states suffer from economic woes,
regional elites to find a

In other

states.

words,

means of distinguishing
it

becomes

access to particular resources

politics

many

if

their

is

behind contemporaiy depictions of
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why

their nation deserv es

Just as needy.

becomes a vibrant means of rallying public support

falsities

does not allow

problems from the problems of other

difficult for elites to justify

the bordering nation

it

But

identity.

despite

its

Therefore, identity

superficiality

and the

In the

matter of the Balkans

I

have

tried to

argue that present-day ethnic and
nationalist-

based conflicts do not necessarily represent
the product of hundreds of years of
relentless
disputes

among

differences,

it

is

different groups.

Although we must be sensitive to mutual
cultural

difficult to accept that the

unending belligerence

in the

Balkans of this

decade has been a function of ethnic hatreds
originating during the Medieval Serb Empire
or
during the Ottoman Empire. Rather, the communist
and post-communist world have

provided the conditions upon which

elites

have abused their positions

political authority while pursuing resources

from a standpoint

and national survival. Thus

that tends to confine the influences

conflicts to the actions of elites in areas in

there other influences acting

upon

in

order to secure

far

I

have argued

of identity and nationalist-based

which these conflicts have occurred. But are

the surge in ethnic conflicts and nationalistic calls?

The

following section attempts to explain how the internotional
community also has contributed
to a less-than-critical understanding of the nature of identity
politics
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and nationalism.

CHAPTER 9
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
The Western world has been ainthing
and

conflict

calls for nationalism in the

but sensitive to the particularities of
ethnic

post-communist world. Policymakers and diplomats

of the United States and Western Europe especially,
have contributed
the idea that ethnic conflict

this occurs,

critical

is

a false consensus

extremely rigid and difficult to assess,

among policymakers

is

to the presentation

much

of

When

less treat.

established, thereby preventing a

more

understanding of identity politics and nationalism from
emerging. Consider the

following statement, for example;

Warren Cliristophcr, whose expert status derived from his position
as Secretajy of State, amiounced on \ht MocNeil-Lehrer
Newshour
that Washington could do nothing because all groups
in Yugoslavia
were consumed by “ancient hatreds” (Sadkovich, 1998: 19).

Such statements are not uncommon and
the 1999

bombing of Serbia

1

can

recall

arc not limited to state-level representatives.

numerous

U

S.

Senators

who

During

in television/radio

interviews presented their understanding of Balkan conflict as one reaching
far back into

world

history.

This

is

dangerous, namely because

it

influences the construction of a narrow

foreign policy which neglects to address the more crucial factors underpinning
conflicts such

as those based on identity.

Ultimately, the

U.S./NATO response

to events in Serbia

consisted of a relentless bombing campaign, supposedly to defend the victims of ethnic
cleansing. Yet, as anyone

realizes,

mutual

hostilities

who even modestly

continues to follow events

and mutual

have remained,

distrust

if

in the

region

not increased. This only

reinforces the misguided belief that identity-based conflicts are tremendously difficult to
treat

and therefore usually must lead
Moreover, by responding

militaristic choices, states

room

for diplomacy.

to physical conflicts.

to ethnic conflicts (such as those in the

such as the U.S. and regional bodies such as

Some

Balkans) with

NATO

leave

little

scholars have even held the belief that the Western world has
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been too slow to produce a more definitive end,

communist world (Dawisha and
the plurality of policymakers

Parrot, 1997: 8-9). Tliis

who do

especially contradictor)

is

,

given

not even accept that such conflicts can be ended in
a

conclusive manner. At the same time,
111

militarily, to ethnic conflicts in the post-

1

am

not denying the severity of atrocities committed

regions such as the Balkans with respect to ethnic conflict.
However,

I

am

suggesting that

the Western world has failed to address conflicts in the
post-communist states in such a
that outright violence

Western/NATO

and

militarv- intervention

believe that physical force

West can be

conflict will be discouraged.

militaristic, then

The Western world,

my

in

model. As mentioned

For example, by observing

members of the Balkans might be more

inclined to

remains a practical means of treating disagreements:

still

way

should not the Balkans engage

in

If the

physical conflict as well?

assessment, has >et to serve as an enviable international role

earlier, identities are

capable of change; this includes the notion of

victim/oppressor. For example, at present both ethnic Albanians and Serbs have been

victims

and oppressors
It

its

also

is

in

the aftermath of the

ironic that

NATO,

NATO

bombing campaign of 1999.

most elaborate, expensive campaign not during the Cold

conflict.

the

and

West

What does

this reveal

will continue to present ethnic conflict in

difficult to treat, for the

War the U
“enemy”

about Western intentions?

S. in particular

sake of

its

own

in international politics.

Or

at the least,

Despite the absence of the Soviet Union

it

this leaves little

room

it

for productive

level

in the

it

in

Kosovo

demonstrates that

states as deeply-rooted

Since the end of the Cold

new means by which

to define the

has been searching for a

its

new

rival.

international objectives

broad range of international

diplomacy

mobilization and calls for nationalism

On one

engaged

entirely possible that the U.S. will use regional

it is

to justify a

deterrent,

but during the

post-communist

conflicts such as those in the Balkans in order to define

purposes. This would allow

War

political purposes.

has been searching for a

War

Cold

instituted to serve as a

in treating the

militarv’ activity.

But

underlying factors of ethnic

post-communist world.
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and

Equally problematic

upon

the Western attempt to impose

is

the post-communist states,

institution.

Without question,

many which have

this

little

m and of itself also

while sub-national groups are experiencing
changes

in

its

own brand of democracy

or no experience with this

relates to political identity

how

because

they perceive themselves, they

often are expected to acquire democratic
characteristics (Dawisha, 1997: 4). This
can be
pamftilly difficult given that they also must
undergo processes of economic privatization and
the construction of new state administrative
institutions. Hence, the order in which
the

West

has advocated the post-communist transition does
not necessarily represent the most
practical means.

Nor have
conflict

the

Western media offered a ftmdamental evaluation of the nature
of ethnic

and nationalistic

We

calls.

live in

an age where the media

media, possess an increasing monopoly on what
1

Wlien conflicts

j 7).

in the

is

— especially

the television

defined as critical news (Dawisha, 1997:

abroad occur, audiences tend to perceive those receiving most

attention as the only or central conflicts occurring in the world
at a given time.

escalates our understanding of

upon

the degree to

those

in

how

severe such conflicts are, thus allow ing us to cast doubt

which they can be remedied. Moreover, when particular

Bosnia or Kosovo occur audiences are deprived of news equalK'

with respect to events

other regions.

in

Tliis

As Quester w arns,

“the

if

conflicts such as

not

more severe

commitment of the American

public to the components of the former Soviet Union will be shockingly uneven” (Quester,

quoted

Dawisha, 1997: 137).

in

A
identity in

further

problem with respect

post-communist

states relates to

Western Europe actively have sought
formerl)' of the

Warsaw

deems

members,

fit

to be

to the international influence

Pact.

its

NATO

to increase

Although

intentions.

NATO

upon the

Since 1994 the

U

S.

membership by including

NATO has yet to subsume all

intentions have

politics

of

and
states

of the states

w hich

it

had a profoundly negative impact upon

reactions in post-communist states, namely Russia (See Dawisha, 1997: 68-100).
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NATO’s

plans, though, for increasing

states

which

difference between

serves as

no longer

membership

does not yet consider

it

invite certain states to join

still

its

it

fit

for

also have had an mimical effect

membership.

reinforces the notion that there

NATO and non-NATO states.

somewhat of a

is

which

USSR was

it

NATO

was designed

initially

is

thought to pose (1997: 69). In

what the West has done by relying upon a

recent ethnic conflicts in the

In matters

a aindamental identity-based

expected to believe that there are other states or
regions

creating an equally volatile security threat as
the
this is just

is

words, by refusing to

Furthermore, the desire to expand

contradiction: the purpose for

relevant, yet the world

some ways

In other

upon those

Balkans— that

is, it

has created a

NATO alliance to engage

new

in

adversarv'.

of identity-based conflicts the West has been particularly
insensitive

toward Russian perspectives. During the Kosovo

Russia expressed

crisis

its

concerning the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. Although the
West and

disapproval

NATO have

sought to establish a better relationship since the end of the Cold War,
the West clearly
ignored Russian pleas during the conflict

in

Kosovo. Instead,

it

leaned toward acceptance of

the belief that the Russian government

was

However,

During the spring of 1999 scholarship from the

this

is

not entirely accurate.

Center for Democracy

in

DC

quite sympathetic to the Milosevic regime.

revealed that Russians were more attached to the prospects for

safety with respect to Serbian citizens

— not necessarily Milosevic.^

serious attention to the Russian position during the

heavily to

w ould

its

ow n

Kosovo

By

conflict, the

role as a determinant in how' ethnic conflict in the

be perceived

—

that

is,

less as

refusing to give

West contributed

former Yugoslavia

a product of elite ambitions and more as a product of

natural hatreds.

A

more

recent

especialK’ baffling, yet

Western construct has been

members of the

First

that

of the “rogue”

World such

^

This concept

is

as the United States and Great

1 first became aware of this through an interview with an unnamed senior policy
Democracy, on CNN/Headline News 5 Ma\' 1999.
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state.

analyst at the Center for

Britain use

it

freeK' as if they have an airtight grasp

of state tend to use the term “rogue state”

which they perceive
security conflicts.

to

upon

in its

acquired

of the First World,

have the tremendous potential for instigating serious international

Often times these

present context. In fact,

its

meaning. Diplomats and heads

to refer to a specific nation not

states’

regimes and their activities tend to be virtually

boycotted by powers such as the U.S. The term rogue

used

its

new meaning

in the

it

state,

however, only recently has been

has been reshaped over the past twenty years and has

post-Cold

War

era.

A

has contributed to the contemporary usage of “rogue”

handfol of U.S. Secretaries of State

state.

All

of them have presumed that

such states have tremendously “irrational” (Mufson 2000: Al) policy intentions,

where they would

to the point

risk self-destruction in order to defy the First World.'® Yet, in
a concise

piece for the Washington Post,

Mufson suggests

that rogue states actually are

concerned

with self-perpetuation. Furthermore, various scholars have posited that the concept of the

rogue state has acted as a post-Cold

War

device used to justify defense system proposals, as

well as a general need to define the present-day
states include Iran, Iraq

enemy (2000: Al). Examples of rogue

and North Korea.

Although the former Yugoslavia does not seem

to

meet the direct

criteria

rogue state (such as the capability to produce nuclear warheads/technology),

members of the
states

international

which possess

community (namely

in the

it

point

is

that

West) have appointed categories for

characteristics diametrically opposite to their

does not excuse the threat of nuclear war. However,

my

of being a

own. Obviously,

implies that

this

members of the Western

world have labeled national communities on the basis of the actions of their leaders, w ho do
not necessarily represent the interests of the masses. Should Serbia qualify as a rogue state

because of the actions of the Milosevic regime? This
structure of

'®

w hat

is

deemed a

Do

nation-state.

Note the U.S. preoccupation with the concept of

all

calls into question the rigidih’

of the members of the nation and the state

rationality/irrationality

traditional theoretical approaches such as ncorealism.
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and

—

a fundamental concept to

become rogues because of the

decisions of their mling administration‘s

How

well does the

stigma of “rogue state” represent the collectivities
of people comprising a nation-state's Just
consider the stereot>pical representations of people
from different ethnic backgrounds whose
states

of origin have been labeled “terrorist”

Concepts such as the rogue
international

community construct

states.

state act as a

the international identit>’ of other states.

themselves, without a point of reference, no state

even a rogue

state.

means by which members of the

is

Taken by

of the First World, the Third World or

But when powers such as those of the West decide to appoint
labels to

other states, they contribute to the subordination/marginalization
of those states. Practically

speaking,

this

it

still is

dangerous

former Yugoslavia a land of renegade factions as

to label the

only complicates any prospects for addressing security issues

m

the region with a critical

eye toward achieving and maintaining an eventual peace. Mufson asks, for
e.xample,

why

the U.S. does not maintain a uniform policy approach to states which they
“could just as
easily call... rogue states” (2000; Al), such as India.

that the First

One

valid response lies in the notion

World consciously and unconsciously chooses how

to define other states.

Scholars and policymakers also must reflect upon the nature of Western intentions with
respect to involvement in recent Balkan conflicts. Has

exclusively about preserving lives

in the

Westeni/NATO “peacekeeping” been

Balkans, or has

it

also represented a desire for

regions such as Europe to bolster and defend the ideals they supposedly represent?
Ignatieff points out, an array of European scholars

for

Balkan conflict prior

to the

in

an effort to reinvigorate “European” values such

as sympathy/concern for the other (Ignatieff in

conflicts.

In

is

quick to

one sense our

Yugoslavia have worked

to

reluctant to scrutinize the potential

Bosnian war. Yet the onset of hostilities has prompted many

of them to assess the region very closely

Ignatieff also

was

As

illustrate the nature

Danchev and Halverson, 1996:
of Western intervention

xi).

in recent

Balkan

efforts to treat unstable situations in regions such as the

prolong more

peacefi.il resolutions.
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former

For example, during the

Bosnian war a number of food supplies intended for
refugees accidentally became directed

toward militants partaking

in the repression

Western world has been willing

of Bosnian Muslims. Ignatieff suggests that
the

minimum,

to provide a

basic line of defense for potential

victims of practices such as genocide. At the same time,
however,
directly confront those leaders (e g. Milosevic)

practices (Ignatieff in

in

who have been

Danchev and Halverson, 1996;

it

has been reluctant to

greatly responsible for such

Has Westem/NATO involvement

xiv).

Balkan conflict actually represented a form of “narcissism”
(1996:
But

NATO

is

xi)?

not the only Western institution/regime to have contributed
to

prolonging Balkan conflict. Take, as another example, the Organization
for Security and

Cooperation

in

Europe (OSCE).

Its

action (or inaction) has been illustrative of

counterproductive decisions with respect to regional conflicts.
Principles Guiding Relations

that such a

violators

framework

restraint

States”

narrow enough

from being enforced. The

sovereignty and

and

is

Among

territorial integrity,

(CSCE, 1997;

to prevent

first six

9) for the

the

OSCE,

it

“Ten
can be seen

compliance among human rights

principles essentially call for protection of state

continued non-intervention, peaceful conflict resolution

from the use of force against other

states (1997; 9).

the organizational and institutional structures of the

shaming mechanisms"

By exploring

will assist in yielding

Hence,

it

is

expected that

OSCE— including tribunals, arbiters and

compliance with human rights

treaties

and

statements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This however does not work well

in practice.

contractual obligations between states in which

it

is

Although

treaties in theory represent

agreed upon that some infringement of

sovereignty will occur (Donnelly, 1998; 27), the case of the former Yugoslavia reveals

itself

as lacking the treaties which could have prevented more recent atrocities. With respect to

other institutional mechanisms such as tribunals,

it is

apparent that legal ailings can be

" Shaming mechanisms include for example the publishing of reports

noncompliance within a given

state.
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that cite violations

and

rendered but certainly not enforced when states
such as Serbia cling to the principle of
sovereignt>'

(CSCE,

1996: 16). Hence,

much

like decisions

of the United Nations, judgements made by the

OSCE

taken by the various structures

can serv e as recommendations but

cannot necessarily be enforced without some form
of sanctions or external involvement
within states committing the greatest

The

point here

is

when

that

sovereignty of other states or

human

political stakes are high

at least

same

or even the environment.

to perceive the issue

attention that other issues

Hence sovereignty,

rarely encounters interference generated by

Within the five years prior
gav'c

tremendous attention

to

enough

do

states

infringe

upon

the

pressure them to allow their sovereignty to be

compromised. However, the West tends
as one not requiring the

rights abuses.

to the onset

of human rights enforcement

demand, such as

as protected by the

human

security,

economics

compact of the OSCE,

rights issues.

of the Bosnian war

Russians communism began

U

S. participation in the

to whither.

OSCE

Yearlv reports of

U.S. activity during this time suggest that the former Yugoslavia was not taken seriously
as

an area of potential instability (CSCE, 1988:

1

1-16).

of the need to encourage economic development

The

in the

OSCE

Balkans and Eastern Europe, but

trade policy concerns ultimately were directed toward relations

Soviet Union. With respect to

upon

human

w ith

the soon to be deflmct

rights awareness, greater concentration

the issue of forced labor in the Soviet

overlooked the precursors

demonstrated an awareness

to abuses in the

Union (1988:

16),

but the

was placed

OSCE generally

former Yugoslavia.

Analyzing the Kosovo conflict challenges some of the

traditional

assumptions about

the nature of human rights protection relative to the international community, as discussed

earlier.

Though

it

is

assumed

that

human

rights violations are practices occurring within the

boundaries of sovereign nations directed by repressive internal regimes, the recent conflict

adds a new dimension: what happens when international actors contribute to a regime’s
decision to enact

human

rights violations?

51

Prior to the onset of the 1999 air strikes
in

U

S. Secretar>-

of State Albright participated

an effort to impose a directive upon the Milosevic regime. This
directive gave preference

to the rebel group,

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which previously was considered

have been an impediment

any peaceful settlement between Milosevic and Kosovo

to

President Rugova. Moreover, the U.S. brand of diplomacy

would have

to include

to

demanded

that a peace settlement

NATO ground forces with the goal of attaining statehood for Kosovo

within the next few years (Kuperman, 1999: A20). Obviously this strategy
was unsuccessful

and

if

anything,

It is

might have helped

it

by no means

he has been an obstacle

my

to

to

augment the

of the Kosovo

intention to exonerate Milosevic or his regime.

peace and an impediment to the cause of human

Nonetheless, the U.S. played a significant role
ethnic cleansing within Kosovo.

is

intensity

Had

in fueling

To

the contrary

rights.

Milosevic’s decision to employ

the U.S. forsaken the

entirely possible that even Milosevic

crisis.

ultimatum made to the Serbs,

would have decided not

to rely

upon ethnic cleansing

given that no massive atrocities had been undertaken against the Kosovars since he came

power

in the late

Wliat

such as the

human

I

to

1980's (Kuperman, 1999: A20).

am

OSCE

suggesting here

is

have been guilty

rights abuses could occur.

infringe

it

upon sovereignty

in

Western world and

in part for fabricating the

For those

who

order to enforce

exists in that principles such as those

been ignored by the

that the

NATO alliance.

of the
Yet

institutions/regimes

circumstances under which

are unconvinced that

still

human

its

rights,

it

it is

feasible to

should be noted that an irony

OSCE, which have endorsed diplomacy, have

this

type of infringement has had

counterproductive results to date.

In tying the

Kosovo

yvithin the territorial space

sense of “duty”

critically the

in

crisis to the

of one

state

matter of

can

human

elicit attention

rights

it

can be seen that atrocities

and action from other

states.

Our

terms of this conflict stems from the U.S.AVest’s refusal to assess

circumstances

in

the former Yugoslavia.
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In turn, this refusal

has alloyved for

human

rights violations to occur.

rights aspect

Hence, the Western world has helped make the human

of the Kosovo conflict a concern. Consequently, some even argue that

(meaning the U.S.) have thus imposed upon ourselves the obligation
economically to those etlmic Albanians

who have been

we

to contribute

displaced by the Serb militarv

(Kuperman, 1999: A20).

With respect

to the dissolution

malleable nature of sovereignty

is

of Yugoslavia

at the

The

readily apparent.

beginning of this decade the

creation of independent states such

as Serbia as well as the creation of autonomous provinces tied to such states (e.g. Kosovo)

how

demonstrates

and economic

sovereignty was fabricated. Put another way,

elites that the

new

was by

virtue of political

sovereign entities of the former Yugoslavia were designed.

Sovereignty relied upon the performative acts of such
alteration

it

of political boundaries” (Fors\the, 1994;

1

elites.

This resulted

19), clearly

in

‘a bewildering

exemplifying

how

sovereign polities are constructed.

Wliat

I

am

suggesting here

is

new

that just as vigorously as elites defined the

sovereign states of the Balkans, international bodies such as the United Nations and the

OSCE could
protection.

But

its

at the

have intervened within such

The OSCE,

employed

in

when

is

order to enforce

Wliere the
better guarantee

OSCE

human

recommendation by

the

is

new Yugoslav

rights

human

to the issue

had

lost

rights compliance.

concerned,

OSCE

states sovereignty temporarily

international action to prevent instability could have been

it

could have played a significant role

rights protection.

120) of Yugoslav states be

have applied

human

for example, pledges not to breach the sovereignty of other nations.

time of the formation of the

determinacy. This

states in order to ensure greater

to the

West

in tiy ing to

One such means could have included

(ForsUhe, 1994:

to insist that “legal recognition”

made contingent upon human

rights compliance.

of delegating foreign economic assistance to such

a

The same could

states,

although

sanctions are by no means the most efficacious means of conducting international affairs.
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Nevertheless, the

West was noi paralyzed

in its position relatu e to the

sovereign states within the former Yugoslavia. This

is

especially so in light of the incentive

to acquire

membership within

the

privileged

members of the EU

they could be prompted to comply with

European Union.

formation of

If states

such as Serbia wish to become

human

rights accords

and agreements.
If sovereignty largely

Biersteker and

West was

Weber argue

is

a function of mutual recognition between states
as

(Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 2-3), then

assert that the international

its

can be seen that the

not powerless with respect to the rise of oppressive state
regimes such as that of

Milosevic. Granted, this model does not apply to

of

it

human

all

community could adopt

rights violations.

However,

scenarios.

the

the difference

same

It

would be

attitude

difficult to

toward China

in light

between China and the recently

(re)formed states of the Balkans rests upon the realization that the West could have

prevented states such as Serbia from becoming repressive giv'cn Serbia's need for sovereign
recognition after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
potential infringement with respect to

now

human

More

broadly, the issue of sovereignty and

rights

abuses suggests that a

can prevent the need for greater infringement
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later.

little

its

infringement

CHAPTER

10

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In light

of the means by which identity-based conflict and

calls for nationalism

have been

constructed throughout various regions of the post-communist
world, what prospects remain
for peace?

One response

is

that the entire notion

further analysis (Bova, 1991:

transition

1

by asking, “transition

In this regard,

13).

to

been successful. Hence, by assuming

we

era begs

one might address the post-communist

former communist order, not
that “transition”

all

such institutions have

necessanly implies democratic

are entering uncertain territory. Scholars and policymakers need to be

careful in generating expectations about the nature of the transition.

civil associations

and

power and exercise
elites

War

what”? Although the centrality of having democratic

institutions has arisen throughout the

transition

of “transition” from the Cold

more

With weak infomial and

institutions (Di Palma, 1991: 49), regional elites continue to usurp

their desire to maintain authority.

As

stands, political

it

and economic

have retained far too much of this capacity.

A

stronger civil society might serve as a better mechanism for developing a national

outlook which takes into account a greater spectrum of the
identity, although this

is

far

from a

cure-all.

citizenrv'

without politicizing

Buttressing civil society

would

entail

assurances that key elements such as free speech would not be hindered (Frentzel-Zagorska,
1990: 759) or that citizens would seek to

become

eligible for voting.

Indeed, there have

been stronger prospects for informal associations among citizens of the post-communist
order.

Even

prior to the

fall

of the Soviet Union evidence indicates a dramatic increase

unofficial associations within Russia,

many which sought

to

become

in

legitimate before the

eyes of the Soviet government. In turn, these relationships tended to provide communist

elites

with a sense of unsteadiness (Brovkin, 1990: 233). This indicates the need for a

strengthening of such associations throughout the post-communist world so as to pose a

challenge to current political and economic

elites.
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However, the

role

of civil society

is

not to

be overemphasized.

It

too can be heavily problematic for the development
of nation-states

given that the entire concept of civil-society encompasses not
only peaceflil and progressive,
but also dangerous and oppressive groups such as mobs.

This section has been designated “Concluding Remarks” but
not “Conclusion” so as
not to imply that

have chosen a

I

rigid, definitive or

narrow

set

of corollaries with respect to

the nature of identity-based politics and nationalism in the post-Cold
contrar>', scholarly

of identity-based
identity

world.

To

the

and practical analyses of this topic are by no means complete. The nature

politics

and nationalism

practitioners to

War

is

not

static.

A

more

critical

understanding of topics such as

entails not only intense research but the willingness

welcome

the

more robust

of scholars and

alternatives to the traditional approaches driving

international relations (and International Relations).

Where

then, does contemporar> scholarly and practical attention to identity-based

conflict leave us? Consider the opening passage of this paper, on the theoretical side,

from

Lake and Rothchild:
The most widely discussed

e.xplanations of ethnic conflict are, at best...

wrong. Etlmic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences,
“ancient hatreds” and centuries-old feuds... Nor were etlmic passions, long
bottled

up by

repressix e

commmiist regimes, simply uncorked by the end

of the Cold War. (Lake and Rothchild, 1996)

At

first

critical

glance this statement would appear to

w ell

within the parameters of a more

outlook upon identitx-based conflict. However, Lake and Rothchild’s analysis

reflects a general trend

future

fall

outcomes

w hich

still

seeks to assume a tremendous amount of predictive power for

in international affairs.

Although they are careful not

to accept the ancient

hatreds argument, the authors adntittedly employ a rational-choice approach to assessing

identity-based, or

their

more

specifically, ethnic conflict (1996: 42), This

assumption that ethnic groups

w ill

approach stems from

react to the uncertainty of the future (in the context

of the post-Cold War). And although the authors acknow ledge the role of elite-based
manipulation, ultimately they introduce a linear model of historical progression
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in

w hich

actors behave in one

manner

as a result of their pure self-interest.
Furthermore,

Rothchild attribute accountability to

Lake and

with respect to the managemeni of ethnic
conflict

elites

as well (1996: 42). This leaves us with a
vague sense of which elites are responsible for

inducing conflict and those which are responsible
for trving to quell

Are they responsible

it.

for both?

In short.

Lake and Rothchild make a strong contribution

conflict but they

their efforts in

to

do not completely break

free of the rational-choice hold.

an attempt to seek out the origins of ethnic conflict they

overemphasize the search

more genealogical approach
of international
that

to the literature

affairs

for beginnings.

on identity-based

By grounding

exliibit a

preference

Such an attempt neglects the importance of a

to identity-based conflict.

Moreover, scholars and practitioners

must wonder what happens w hen a rational-choice paradigm such as

of Lake and Rothchild does not apply to situations

w ould. By no means have

all

ethnic/identity-based conflict.

I

w hich

of the post-communist

states

As

in

mentioned

at the

the authors contend that

w orld

suffered from undying

beginning of this writing, the creation

of a large-scale paradigm which universalizes the origins of identity-based conflict
intention.

On

Such an

effort

would be

it

is

not

my

futile.

the practical side, media-oriented accounts of recent identity-based conflicts such as

those

in the

Balkans continue to emphasize w ith vigor the

Even

in the

midst of the Kosovo conflict of 1999, efforts were

role

of complex, lengthy histories.

made by

describe the historical complexities troubling Serbs and Albanians

w ith

the print

media

to

regard to territorial

claims over areas within the former Yugoslavia. One such account brings the reader back to
the Twelfth Century in order to trace the origins of present-day ethnic conflict (Perlez,

1999), Granted, the manipulative strength of leaders such as Milosevic

media representations such as

this

Veiy

acknow ledged, but

continue to suggest that populations neatly maintain an

awareness of their nation’s past such
nationalistic policies.

is

that this

rarely does the

knowledge impels them

media attempt

57

to support

to reverse this

conception and

posit that manipulative elites

survival or their

own

draw upon

objectives.

the subjectivih of historv' in order to pursue

Rather, they inject a strong pessimistic outlook upon

regional affairs and insist that nothing but “resentment and
hostility” (Kinzer, 1992)

consume areas

suffering from identity-based conflicts.

From a more

critical perspective,

other media representations have given credence to the notion that
present-day identity-

based conflict and nationalism
ambitions (Kaufman, 1992).

in the

Still

Balkans are the

result

of contemporary political

others have professed the belief that the

coalition has been far too impatient in pursuing a peaceful

outcome

obsessed with racial divisions (Rosenfeld, 2000: A35). Again,
the importance of historv' or to eliminate

how

historv’

its

validity.

is

it

However,

it

in the

Balkans— one

my

not

also

U.S./NATO

is

not

intention to deny

crucial to scaitinize

has been re-presented to the masses.

With respect

to foreign

policymakers and diplomats, a more

critical

understanding of

identity-based conflict continues to be ignored. At the international level, the Western

world, including

how

best to

its

NATO

manage

Put another way, the

its

forces, has transfomied the

aftermath, and

“NATO

whom

Kosovo

conflict into a dispute over

should be responsible for such management.

allies are fighting

among themselves over how

to

keep a

deteriorating situation in the Serbian prov ince from spinning out of their control” (Perlez,

2000). Balkan instability, then, has become highly politicized to the point where the

and other leading

More

states

of the West have been consumed by protecting their

own

U

S.

interests.

particularly, the U.S. has sought to diminish the publicity of failed militarv’ efforts in

the Balkans so as to evade negative exposure in

upcoming

national elections (2000).

Meanwhile, unrest between Serbs and Kosovars continues but Western

politics assert

themselves over the security of an otherwise insecure region.
Returning to the case of the Baltics, similar portrayals of the

volatilitv'

of ethnic conflict

have per\ aded media analyses. Such representations warn of the brewing conflicts between
ethnic Russians living in the abroad.

Interestingly, a Russia
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Today

article uses the

term

‘powder keg” (Pounsett, 1998)

employed by Larrabee

to describe the nature of this situation— the

in his edited

volume

to

which

I

made

same term

reference earlier. At the

same

time, however, articles such as this also have been willing
to concede that the concept of
identity throughout the former Soviet states

which

was assigned

identity

now

is

a sensitive topic because of the means by

to citizens during the Soviet era (1998). In other words,
there

ore indications that media analysts are aware of the highly constructed
nature of identity

in

the post-communist world.

One of the
unrelated.

driving claims behind this

w riting

has been that theor>’ and practice are not

Nor should ihty be estranged from one

about the Balkans and the Baltics, but

it

also

is

another. This paper largely has been

intended to be an exercise in better

understanding the relationship between theoretical approaches
applications in

ir.

There

is

a strong prevalence of w hat

I

in

IR and

practical

have referred to as the “traditional”

theoretical approaches in present-day policymaking within

and between nation-states. Such

a connection between these two entities obligates us to acknow ledge that theoiy and practice
are not disconnected from each other. With this in mind, however, scholars and practitioners

of international

affairs

have

little

reason to rest and remain content with the dominant

approaches of conducting relations betw een
critical studies

states.

and appraisals of international

It is

affairs

is

for this reason that the value of

just beginning to gain recognition.

International relations and international relations have not e.xhausted themselves of fresh

perspectives.

scholars

and

How^ much progress they can achieve
practitioners to

will

depend upon the willingness of

open up a dialogue with challenging approaches.
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